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This thesis builds a public goods case for government intervention in the academic journal 
market. Synthesizing information from interviews with the existing quantitative and qualitative 
literature accomplishes this goal. The cost of doing business in the academic publishing market 
has steadily risen over time. In response, an “open access” (OA) movement has formed. 
Members of the movement argue that making academic research freely accessible to anyone with 
an Internet connection is the ideal way to control these costs. Others, however, are satisfied with 
the status quo. Determining who pays what price to allow free access has become increasingly 
important. National open access initiatives could be implemented without government aid if 
universities and academic libraries worked together; however, a collective action problem 
prevents cooperation. The government has tools that could be used to help these stakeholders 
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The ease with which academics and research communities can access scholarly 
knowledge is a key requirement for the innovation process. The ways in which people access this 
knowledge have drastically changed over the last 40 years. Previously, accessing scholarly 
knowledge was a cumbersome process that entailed patrons either going to an academic library 
to receive print journals or receiving journals via the mail. The Internet quickly presented people 
inside and outside of the academic community with the chance to enhance a “free market of 
ideas” (Gruss 2003). Supporters of free access began organizing into a so-called open access 
(OA) movement designed to move from an oligopolistic status quo to a new “open access” status 
quo. This was deemed possible though the widespread use of online repositories and journals. 
Open access repositories, known as the “Green” road to OA, are storage sites in which published 
articles can be deposited. Open access journals, which are journals that do not operate on 
subscription revenue, are called the “Gold” road to OA.  
The OA movement is rooted in a scientific discourse that emphasizes the free exchange 
of ideas. The Internet, rather than being the source of this movement, is one mechanism that 
could help academics better reach a status quo of unfettered scholarly communication. 
Academics have historically valued free and easy access to their work by their peers and 
communities. Academic libraries were and are one step to reaching this end. The Internet is 
another tool to further reduce barriers to access. !
The status quo, however, has largely been unchanged. Open access advocates are unable 
to find a collective way to transition to a new “open access” status quo. Convincing skeptics that 
OA is a sound policy has also made only modest progress. The problems are determining the 
price at which research should be provided to customers and who should pay. Some argue that 
! #!
the government should not intervene in the journal market and let the stakeholders resolve the 
problems on their own; others think that government has policy tools that can push the actors 
toward an “open access” status quo. 
1.1 Objective 
This thesis will build a public goods case for government intervention in the academic 
journal market.1 I will build this case by identifying signs of a market failure and describing a 
collective action problem. In doing so I will make the following arguments. First, the 
subscription-based academic journal market has failed as evidenced by rising subscription prices. 
The purchasers of these subscriptions are facing increasing difficulty paying these costs. The 
knowledge found in academic journals, most of which is fully or partially generated with 
government support, is a publicly funded public good that produces benefits for people inside 
and outside of academia.2  
Second, a collective action problem is preventing the stakeholders from transitioning 
from an oligopolistic market to a new author-pays system. This problem arises from several 
conditions that open access proponents cannot individually overcome. Third, a variety of 
government interventions are possible to address this collective action problem. These 
interventions, some of which are more feasible than others, create conditions for the stakeholders 
to reach a new “open access” status quo. 
Finally, this paper demonstrates the ways in which interests and ideas manifest at all levels of 
the open access debate. These concepts play critical roles among advocates and within 
government. Before the arrival of the Internet, the financial interests of the stakeholders were the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!Open access books are excluded to limit the scope of this thesis. !
2 Benefits that spread to third parties outside of a given market are known as positive 
externalities. 
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primary guides for their decision-making. The emergence of the Internet, however, has upset the 
pre-Internet status quo. These stakeholders argue, correctly in my judgment, that the author-pays 
system is the ideal way to ensure that publicly funded academic research is disseminated as 
widely as possible.  
1.2 Methodology 
All of the arguments are made using an extensive literature review and the results of semi-
structured interviews. The literature is composed of qualitative and quantitative data.  A market 
failure is established by linking basic economic modeling to real-world trends identified from the 
review and interviews. The literature outlining these trends is found in peer reviewed research 
and books, Canadian and non-Canadian reports from academic libraries, freely available 
government documents, and news releases. The peer reviewed literature was retrieved using the 
following search engines: Google scholar, Academic Search Complete and Web of Science.  
Interviews were conducted with 12 well-placed informants in the academic journal market. 
Academics, librarians and legal experts came from Athabasca university, Harvard, the University 
of Saskatchewan, the University of Ottawa, and Simon Fraser university. Political and policy 
perspectives came from the MP Brad Trost, as well as a senior administrator from the Canada 
Foundation for Innovation. Finally, the commercial publishers that I contacted directed me to 
their statements on open access from their websites. Every participant was initially invited via e-
mail to take part in a 30-minute semi-structured telephone interview. The semi-structured 
approach allowed for flexibility in the way in which discussions proceeded, with important 
issues emerging during interviews that were not covered by the questions. The questions were 
designed to gather opinions on topics ranging from the state of the journal market to the 
! %!
feasibility of adopting a national open access model without government support.3 The wording 
of the questions was tailored to specific participants to elicit responses.  
An interview time was set up if the experts chose to participate. They were asked to sign 
a University of Saskatchewan Behavioural Ethics consent form, return the signed form, and keep 
copies for their own records. A transcript release form was also sent and returned at the end of 
the study. Ten of the 12 interviews were recorded using a digital recorder. The remaining experts 
participated via e-mail due to time constraints. All data was then stored on a secure computer and 
transcribed into individual Microsoft Word documents by the principal researcher. The 
completed transcripts were sent to the participants for their review and approval, with the new 
transcripts being returned via e-mail. The release forms were also signed and returned at this 
time.  
1.3 Thesis structure 
This thesis unfolds as follows. Chapter one provides a brief introduction to the open 
access issue, describes the objectives and structure of the thesis, and outlines the methodology 
used throughout the thesis. Chapter two provides background to the open access issue. This is 
accomplished by describing open access and the stakeholders involved. Context is needed to 
show why the open access issue matters to both the Canadian government and governments 
around the world, as well as show where Canada’s open access policy environment sits relative 
to the rest of the world. Knowing who is involved in the issue is also important. Descriptions of 
the many stakeholders and the arguments they use for the open access issue are found in this 
chapter. The chapter concludes with an outline of the rolls that ideas and interests play in the 
issue. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 The questions are found in Appendix A.  
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Chapter three describes the status quo using conceptual and empirical information. This 
is important for a few reasons. First, no comprehensive academic analysis of the status quo has 
been done. Describing the status quo therefore contributes to the academic literature by shedding 
light on an under-researched topic. Second, giving a positive “what is” description of the current 
publishing system is needed to build a case for government intervention and identify points at 
which intervention is possible. Public policymakers increasingly create evidence-based policies, 
and describing the status quo is a crucial step in this process. 
Chapter four shows what open access transition entails. This section outlines the 
normative “what should/could be”. The author-pays system is a radically different way of 
determining who pays what cost. Implementing such a system will generate positive and 
negative externalities by changing the behaviour of everyone involved in the market. 
Stakeholders and public policymakers need to know the nature of these changes to minimize the 
risks of transition.  
The policy options available to the government are outlined in chapter five. The 
implications of any intervention are also discussed. A critical part of policy analysis is to aid 
decision-making by providing implementable policy options. Policy analysts seek to predict the 
broader ramifications of intervention. Changing the dynamics of a complex system to produce 
certain outcomes is rarely straightforward, and the public policy implications section covers this 









Knowledge is an important good that affects many parts of society. This is particularly 
the case for knowledge produced from academia. A substantial amount of literature outlines the 
direct and indirect benefits that a country’s stock of available knowledge, notably technical 
knowledge, provides to an economy. Direct benefits take the form of technological advances, 
increased human resource capacity for the public and private sectors, contributions to the 
innovation process, skills training, and the simplifying of complex and complicated information 
into easily digestible forms (Tassey 2012, 1; Nelson and Romer 1996, 1-2, 20; Bush 1945). 
Indirectly, the accumulation of knowledge is presumed to contribute to the fostering of a more 
enlightened and democratic society (Lipset 1959, 1-3; Glaeser , Ponzetto and Shliefer 2007, 1-5).  
Academic knowledge, a specific type of knowledge produced by higher education 
institutions, plays a critical role in the innovation process. The Oslo Manual defines innovation 
as “the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or process, 
a new marketing method, or a new organizational method in business practices, workplace 
organization or external relations” (OECD/Eurostat 2005, 46). Using new knowledge to upgrade 
old processes and methods can add value, create efficiencies and make better use of scarce 
resources. Science, technology, research, development, and innovation exist in interlocking 
relationships, where each practice can influence the others (Science, Technology and Innovation 
Council 2012, 14-17).  
The primary unit through which academic knowledge is both transmitted and accessed is 
the academic journal. An underlying assumption about the benefits that may accrue from 
research is that academic journals, and knowledge by proxy, are easily accessible for members of 
the academic and non-academic communities. If access to academic journals was fully restricted, 
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i.e., journal producers and researchers did not consent to their work being accessed by anyone, 
then any related social benefits would accrue slowly at best.  On the other hand, the products of 
academic research are sold to others and subscription costs are the typical means by which 
access is granted.  
2.1 Defining open access 
Open access refers to making academic research accessible and usable by anyone at any 
time. Specifically, the Budapest Open Access Initiative defines open access as the  
“permitting [of] any users to read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, or link to 
the full texts of these articles, crawl them for indexing, pass them as data to software, or 
use them for any other lawful purpose, without financial, legal, or technical barriers 
other than those inseparable from gaining access to the internet itself”.  
 
Literature is rendered open access by removing price barriers and permission barriers. 
Price barriers are any cost that restricts a customer from accessing research. Examples of price 
barriers include subscriptions and license fees. Permissions barriers are any legal restrictions on 
the use of a manuscript, such as copyright. So-called “open access” journals and repositories are 
the mediums through which this literature can be accessed at no cost and without permission 
from the author.  
Open access journals are found on the Internet and may or may not be peer reviewed.4 
They do not survive on customer purchasing, such as subscription fees. Instead, financing comes 
from the following sources: Advertising, sponsorships, internal and external subsidies, donations, 
fundraising, endowments, in-kind support, partnerships, and Article Processing Charges (APCs) 
(SPARC 2013). About half of open access journals generate around 30% of their revenue by 
charging submission charges, page charges, illustration fees, society membership fees, and color 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 For example, the journal PLoS http://www.plosone.org/ is peer reviewed and the Elder Law 
Studies http://www.ssrn.com/update/lsn/lsn_elder-law.html is not. 
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surcharges (ibid.). Some publishers charge a fee for all submitted articles, whereas others only 
charge for articles that will be published.  
Approximately 26% of open access journals listed in the Directory of Open Access 
Journals (DOAJ) use APCs (*+,+-+.! /.0! 12345! #6"#7! #). This fee is spread amongst 
publishers, authors, academic libraries and/or an author’s host institution. According to SPARC 
(2013), 
Article processing fees are wholly or partially subsidized, either by a research grant 
(34%), a foundation grant (5%), or by the author’s host department (8%) or institutional 
library (27%). The payment of such fees out of an author’s personal funds appears 
relatively low—about 5% across all open access journal. Several research funding 
agencies have policies supporting the payment of article fees, and a growing number of 
academic institutions have established funds to cover all or part of the article processing 
fee for articles submitted by affiliated authors to open-access publications. 
 
Open access repositories are online indexes in which published material is deposited, 
stored and indexed for future access. They function as “containers” of research. Many 
universities maintain their own repositories; they contain published material of all types. There 
are also other repositories not attached to a particular institution are available on the Internet5. 
Repositories do not always have the quality control mechanisms found in peer reviewed journals. 
As such, the deposited articles can be of varied quality.  
Article deposits can be done with or without a delay. Deposit delays, which range from 
six to 36 months and are used by all types of publishers, are called embargo periods. Immediate 
uploads are possible if an author is not bound by funding stipulations and/or reuse policies used 
by publishers of any type which require a deposit to be delayed. Some commercial and non-
profit journals also allow for articles to be immediately uploaded into a repository if a fee is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 A list of Canadian repositories is found at http://www.carl-abrc.ca/ir.html 
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paid.6 For example, a researcher funded by the Canada Health Services Research Foundation 
(CHSRF) who wants to publish in an Elsevier owned journal must make their work freely 
accessible within 6 months of the work being published.  
  The use of embargo periods has been justified in two ways. First, authors are free to use 
their work as they want during the delay.7 For example, an author can self-publish a work for 
profit if the work is not in the process of being published in a subscription journal or publish in a 
journal of his or her choosing. Second, they are designed to ensure that journal subscriptions are 
not cancelled en mass. The argument is that if research were immediately and freely accessible, 
then consumers would cancel subscriptions. This argument has some merit, as many academic 
libraries note that they would cancel subscriptions and either save the money or use the funds to 
pay for APCs (Bennett 2012).  
 Embargoes can also be problematic. Some commercial publishers will make any article 
in a subscription journal freely accessible if a fee such as the $3000 charged by Wiley is paid 
(Wiley 2013). Authors who want their work immediately accessible in a reputable commercial 
journal may not be able to pay this fee. Academic libraries have responded by setting up open 
access funds; for example, the University of Calgary Open Access Authors Fund allows 
prospective authors to apply for funding if the journal is peer reviewed (University of Calgary 
2013). 
Open access publishing costs also differ according to discipline. Researchers in the STM 
disciplines face higher APCs than researchers in SSH disciplines. According to Solomon and 
Bjork (2012, 1490), researchers spent $64, 400, 000 on APCs for Biomedical journals in 2010. 
This contrasts with Arts and Humanities researchers ($84, 000), General Science journals ($640, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 A journal with subscription and open access components is known as a “hybrid” journal. !
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000), Social Sciences ($3, 398, 000), Technology and Engineering ($4, 906, 000), and Earth 
Sciences ($17, 650, 000). Biomedical journals also charged the highest average APC at around 
$1, 200. The Earth Sciences, Technology and Engineering, Social Sciences, Arts and 
Humanities, and General Science journals charged averages ranging from approximately $400 to 
$600 (ibid., 1491). 
The prevalence of OA has also grown over time. For example, the DOAJ has increased 
the number of it’s searchable journals from about 1, 400 titles in 2004 to over 6, 000 titles in 
2011 (Morrison 2011, fig. 5). If the inflation of titles followed an approximate average 3.5% 
annual growth rate of scholarly journals over the same time period, then about 1, 700 titles would 
have been expected in 2011. A similar growth trend has been found for OA articles in the DOAJ. 
About 62, 000 articles were searchable in 2004, whereas over 500, 000 articles were searchable 
in 2011 (ibid.) This rate exceeds the average 3% annual growth rate of searchable articles over 
the same time period. About 75, 000 searchable articles would be expected in 2011 with a 3% 
growth rate. 
The “gold” and “green” open access models have strengths and weaknesses. A significant 
strength is the rapid accessibility to research that otherwise would not be easily accessible. 
Indeed, this feature of OA targets one of the core issues of scholarly communication mentioned 
earlier. Another strength of OA is the lowering of publishing costs. The size and scope 
publishing has grown over time. For example, researchers have steadily produced more articles 
over the last decade, with article lengths increasing from an average of 7.4 pages to 12.4 pages. 
The cost of printing these articles, which may also include more figures, have increased as a 
result. Open access publishing is electronic; as such, costs normally incurred during the printing 
process are eliminated (Ware and Mabe, 35). 
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Open access, however, is not flawless. A vulnerability of OA is the higher average cost of 
APCs for STM disciplines relative to SSH disciplines. If high average APC costs for STM 
journals is the norm, then some researchers seeking to publish in these journals will require more 
grant funding than their SSH counterparts. These higher costs can pressure government granting 
agencies to redistribute grant funding. As Porter (2012, 5) suggests, policies designed to pay for 
APCs can result in funding being arbitrarily redistributed, such as from teaching-oriented 
universities to research-oriented universities. 
The rapid and exponential growth of OA, particularly OA journals, is another source of 
vulnerability. This growth has outpaced efforts to educate academics about the quality of OA 
journals. This lack of awareness has given rise to predatory publishing practices. These so-called 
“predatory” or “vanity” journals are designed to maximize profit by having very high acceptance 
rates and no peer review (Beall 2012).8 These publishers profit by charging high APC costs. 
Some of these journals also name researchers to their editorial boards without consent and/or 
plagiarize and publish research. Similarly, some authors wanting to expand their list of 
publications can submit research to these low-quality journals and likely have the work 
published (ibid.).   
2.1.1 Price barriers - The author-pays system 
The author-pays system is the business model that removes price barriers. Commercial 
publishers do not receive subscription fees from customers, instead being compensated via APCs 
by publishing academics and/or their sponsors9. In other words, this system spreads all costs 
amongst the producers of academic research. When all costs are fully borne by this group, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!)!9:;<!;<<=>!/,<+!/??,;><!@+!4>?+<;@+4;><A!B.>!<=C:!4>?+<;@+4D!1>/,,!E#6"#F!:;G:,;G:@<!;<!H+=.0!/@!:@@?IJJKKKA;.@>,,>C@=/,/4C:;L>AC+-J!
9 Prices are set through contract negotiations between commercial publishers and authors. 
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criterion of free access is met and the idea of open access comes to life. There is more than one 
way for an APC to be paid. Generally, payment sources are the following: Private (Self-
financed), private and public (Self-financing supplemented with research grants) or public 
(Research council grants, institutional payments). For example, a university can deposit money 
earmarked for APCs into an APC fund in cooperation with other universities. The institutions 
then allow their publishing faculty to access the money based on pre-defined policy guidelines.  
The biggest issue with the author-pays system is its questionable sustainability at any 
scale. Some stakeholders may not be able to pay APCs that are too costly. As a result, any 
repository or journal that survives on these fees may lose revenue and potentially die. Fees that 
are too low may not cover the operating costs of the journal or repository. Generating sufficient 
revenue is only possible if a high number of authors pay a relatively low APC. Doing this is 
impossible if the quality of published or deposited articles is compromised.   
2.1.2 Permissions barriers - Legal perspective  
Copyright law is an integral part of the entire publishing system. The Canadian Copyright 
Act defines copyright as “the sole right to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part 
thereof in any material form whatever, to perform the work or any substantial part thereof in 
public or, if the work is unpublished, to publish the work or any substantial part thereof. . .” 
(Government of Canada Copyright Act 2013). Normally researchers who publish a work have 
the option to place copyright and licensing restrictions on the work. These restrictions, known as 
permission barriers, specify the ways in which the work can be used.  
Everyone involved in the cycle of research production can place certain requirements or 
restrictions on the way a work is published, reproduced and/or made accessible.10 These controls 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Stipulations include royalties mechanisms and controls on use and reuse.  
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fall under the purview of the Fair Dealing clause of the Copyright Act. Fair Dealing is defined as 
statutory exceptions to copyright infringement. These protections are enforceable boundaries that 
apply to the underlying “fairness” of a transaction. They become legally enforceable after the 
author officially registers their work through the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO 
2013). The access model used does not change or otherwise interfere with these boundaries.  
Consider a researcher who submits a manuscript for publication in the Elsevier-owned 
journal Cell. If the work is accepted, then the researcher can then negotiate the transfer of their 
copyrights to Elsevier. If the manuscript contains a figure from another author, then the 
researcher must receive permission from the original author to reproduce the work. At this point, 
Elsevier and the researcher own certain rights to the way that the article can be used (Cell 2013). 
The researcher loses some rights and Elsevier gains some rights. 
Open access publishing, however, removes most permission barriers that are found in 
subscription models. This does not mean that open access models are not legal. While 
interviewing a prominent legal scholar on the legal dimensions of open access, the compatibility 
of open access and copyright were discussed11:  
… publishers have solved their problem simply by getting your [researcher] permission 
before they publish and they do that without a contract ... A funder can say…if you take 
our money you'd have to make a result open access…It's simply a contract you make 
with your funder ... You retain the rights to retain open access and you use those rights 
to use open access… your funders are happy because they get what they wanted. Your 
publisher should be happy because it consented to publish your work anyway knowing 
that your work would be open access.  
 
The “fairness” of the transactions is of concern. Now consider a researcher who publishes 
in an open journal such as the Public Library of Science ONE (PLoSONE 2014). This journal, 
which is owned by the publisher PLoS, uses Creative Commons licensing to stipulate how the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!""!The interviewee chose to remain anonymous. !
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article is made usable. The PLoS licensing guide states that: “authors retain ownership of the 
copyright for their content, but allow anyone to download, reuse, reprint, modify, distribute, 
and/or copy the content as long as the original authors and source are cited. No permission is 
required from the authors or the publishers” (PLoS 2013).12  
2.1.3 Research as a public good 
Conceptually, many goods can be classified based on their excludability and rivalry. 
Rivalry refers to whether or not the use of a good by one person precludes another person from 
using the same good. If a person can stop another person from using a good, then that good is 
excludable.13 Knowledge as a toll good arises when, for example, some researchers repeatedly 
read a research article in a subscription journal (non-rivalry), but other researchers cannot afford 
to pay the subscription fee (Excludability). Knowledge as a public good, however, means that 
nobody needs to pay a fee to access the research (non-excludability). Rendering knowledge 
freely accessible is thus synonymous with research being made open access (Gray, Fulton and 
Furtan 2007, 7).  
Some stakeholders want publicly funded research to be primarily toll-gated (pay to 
access). Blocking access by charging some fee is known as toll gating. A toll gate can be either 
artificial or natural. Charging subscription fees is an example of an artificial barrier restricting 
access to a good. An example of a natural access barrier is the prerequisite knowledge needed to 
understand the contents of a given journal. The highly technical nature of some subjects, such as 
those found in the natural sciences, act as built-in “natural” toll-gates. A customer could pay a 
journal subscription fee (the artificial toll gate) but be unable to understand the journals contents 
(the natural toll gate). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"#!This statement outlines the functions of a Creative Commons license.!
13 The types of goods are public, private, toll, and common pool. 
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Others think that research should be a public good (freely accessible to all). Open access 
achieves this end by changing academically produced knowledge into a good that is accessible 
by anyone at any time in any place. Research becomes non-excludable, a change from toll-gated 
access that is guided by Intellectual Property Regime (IPR) guidelines. One consequence of this 
change is that the cost of publishing is shifted entirely onto the knowledge producers or funders. 
Consumers do not pay for access. Stated another way, the maximum that a customer is willing to 
pay to access this research drops to zero at the expense of the producers. Consider Figure one 
below, which shows a conceptual model of research as a public good.  
 
Figure 1 Conceptual model of research as a public good. 
Assume that journal supply is linear. The price a customer is willing to pay, denoted by 
the horizontal Demand line, is zero regardless of the pricing that the seller offers. Stated another 
way, there is no price that a seller could use that the customer would pay. Publishers would not 
be able to generate revenue, as no consumer (academics, libraries, universities, and the general 
public) would pay any fee. The market equilibrium is found at the intersection of the downward 
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sloping Supply line meeting the Demand line on the vertical axis at price = $0.14 A market for 
open access thus forms when subscription prices are $0 per journal. However, when the price 
reaches zero, there is no output and no articles are published.  
2.1.4 Peer review and the issue of journal quality  
The quality of a publication is of principal concern for most people who access academic 
research. There is a perception that open access literature found in either journals or repositories 
is not peer reviewed or that administrators knowingly publish or deposit low quality articles 
(Bohannon 2013). Stated another way, the author-pays system and high-quality peer review are 
perceived as mutually exclusive or of low compatibility. Conversely, peer reviewed subscription 
journals are considered more stringent in their manuscript acceptance guidelines. This argument 
implies that the mode of journal access is causally linked to journal quality.  
The above argument may or may not be true. Any possible link between access models 
and quality does not mean that the relationship is causal. That is, correlation does not equal 
causation. The ways that journals can be accessed, be it an open access journal or subscription 
journal, are ways of doing business. Peer review is an unstandardized process whether the 
journals are of the subscription or open access variety. For example, the open access journal 
PLoS has a rigorous review process and rejects an average of 31% of all submissions per year 
(PLoS 2013). In this case, the perception of low quality may or may not cause the journal owners 
to use a stringent acceptance policy. 
On the other hand, there is some overlap between peer review and mode of access. Some 
repository administrators may review an article before deposit. Similarly, some repositories may 
stipulate that only peer reviewed research will be uploaded. In either case, however, the function !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 An equilibrium is the point where competing variables, such as journal price and quantity 
supplied, are balanced. 
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of repository administrators is not to determine the quality of a manuscript. Instead, they are 
more concerned with ensuring that the repository functions smoothly.  
2.2 Open access policies around the world 
 Governments from Canada and abroad have used economic and ideological arguments to 
justify a variety of interventions in the academic publishing market. The Canadian research 
councils have gradually moved to make publicly funded research freely accessible. Within the 
granting agencies, this move has been motivated partially by the growing field of knowledge 
mobilization. Knowledge mobilization is defined as efforts taken to improve the production and 
accessibility of research, as well as generating consumer desire to access and use this research 
(Levin 2008, 12). Exploring and testing ways to make knowledge freely accessible is an 
important part of the knowledge mobilization strategy. Open access is considered the ideal way 
to realize this goal.  
In Canada, the Tri-Agency research councils have followed international developments 
on the OA issue. For example, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) 
has signed the Berlin Declaration on Open Access to Knowledge in the Sciences and Humanities 
and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC) has endorsed the Global 
Research Council Action Plan towards Open Access to Publications. The Canada Institute for 
Health Research (CIHR) has an open access policy in place that remains unchanged.15 The 
agencies recently released a draft document on their stance on open access policies. The 
objective of the policy is to “improve access to the published results of research funded by the 
Agencies, and to increase the dissemination and exchange of research results.” (Draft Tri-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 See Section four “What are the Agencies’ current policies on open access? Why harmonize?” 
at http://www.nserc-crsng.gc.ca/NSERC-CRSNG/policies-politiques/OpenAccessFAQ-
LibreAccesFAQ_eng.asp#8 for more information. !
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Agency Open Access Policy 2013, 2).” The core values and ideals driving this objective are 
committing to academic freedom and the right to publish, maintaining high quality and standards 
of research, aligning with the practices of international funding agencies, promoting the 
proliferation and advancement of research in all disciplines, and adhering to established and new 
best practices in research (ibid., 1). 
For peer-reviewed journal publications, a recipient of a grant from any of the agencies 
has two guidelines to follow. The first requires that a recipient must either submit an article to a 
peer reviewed journal that offers open access or deposit the peer-reviewed full-text article in an 
online repository. The journal does not need to be a “gold” journal. Also, the repository can be 
institutional or discipline-specific. In both cases, there must be an embargo period ranging from 
immediate accessibility to a one-year delay. The guidelines for publication-related research data 
sets are Agency-specific. The CIHR mandates that their grant recipients place their research data 
in a “green” repository of their choosing. The data sets must also be kept for a minimum of five 
years (Draft Tri-Agency Open Access Policy 2013, 2). The SSHRC and NSERC do not have 
mandatory data retention or archiving policies. The SSHRC, however, has a Research Data and 
Archiving Policy that facilitates rather than mandates making data available to others.16  
The policy developments in Canada, however, lag behind developments in other 
countries. According to ROARMAP (2014), Canada has implemented 22 open access policies as 
of 2014. Compare this amount to the number of policies in Australia (28), the United Kingdom 
(60) and the United States (125) for the same time period. Second, Canada is not among the top 
10 countries in the amount of known repositories when measuring the proportion of open access !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 See Section eight “Does the draft policy require making data openly accessible?” at 
http://www.nserc-crsng.gc.ca/NSERC-CRSNG/policies-politiques/OpenAccessFAQ-
LibreAccesFAQ_eng.asp#8 for more information. !
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repositories by country. For example, the top five countries are the United States, United 
Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and Spain (OpenDOAR 2014). An important consideration is that 
the amount of repositories may differ as a function of relative population size. For example, the 
smaller amount of repositories in Canada could be due to Canada having less academic 
institutions, and therefore less institutional repositories, relative to countries such as the United 
Kingdom. Similarly, the lack of open access policies in Canada could be due to a smaller 
population relative to the United States and United Kingdom. That is, larger populations may 
need a broader range of policies to address research access issues.  
The UK government has been a leader in tackling the open access issue. Policy makers 
recognized that the changing landscape of academic publishing needed an appropriate 
government response. A recently released study, commonly called the Finch report, offered 
several recommendations to guide the governments’ decisions (Finch 2011, ). Every 
recommendation was accepted by the national government, including expanding digital 
infrastructure, implementing a national “gold” open access journal model and requiring publicly 
funded research outputs be placed in repositories. Note, however, that the government has been 
criticized for supporting open access journals due to the uncertain sustainability of this model 
(2011). Sustainability, defined as the capacity for journals to survive only on APCs, is threatened 
when authors do not have the money to pay this cost. The owners of open access journals must 
risk the possibility that not enough authors can or will pay the cost.  
 Australia and the United States have also implemented open access policies. Both 
governments have recently mandated that publicly funded research from any discipline must be 
placed in freely accessible repositories (Australian Government 2013, Department of Health and 
Human Services 2008). The United States has received notable praise for implementing open 
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access policies that render all federally funded research freely accessible.17 A key difference 
between the UK and the United States and Australia, however, is that only the UK supports open 
access journals. The Australian and United States governments consider open access journals a 
risky investment due to the sustainability issue noted above.  
The policy landscape in the developing world is different. Members of academia and 
governments face difficulties in connecting and contributing to global and local knowledge 
societies (BioMed Central 2013). Blade Nzimade, the current South African Minister of Higher 
Education and Training, noted that African researchers are primarily consumers of research from 
developed nations (UNESCO 2009).18 This does not, however, imply that open access policies 
have not been developed or implemented. Many open access initiatives in Africa have been 
pursued (Armstrong, De Beer, Kawooya, Prabhala, and Schonwetter 2010). For example, 
publicly funded universities that are members of the Consortium of Academic and Research 
Libraries in Ghana (CARLIGH) have accepted private universities as members. This policy was 
implemented in order to lower the costs of accessing electronic journals. 
2.3 Stakeholders 
In Canada, a variety of stakeholders from all areas of the market have voiced several 
justifiable arguments in favor of transitioning to a new open access status quo. This new 
equilibrium would involve all publicly funded research being made freely accessible to 
everybody. These actors argue that the government should play a larger role in facilitating open 
access than it currently does. Table 2 provides a brief description of the stakeholders, their roles 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 See the discussion by Timmer (2013) at http://arstechnica.com/science/2013/02/obama-
administration-backs-open-access-to-all-federal-research/ for more information. ")!These consumption patterns rely, in part, on free accessibility. !
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in the market and their arguments on the merits and downsides of transitioning to a new “open 
access” status quo. 
Table 1 
 
Description of stakeholders and their perspectives on open access transition 
Stakeholders Description and role in 
the market 
Arguments for open 
access 
Arguments against open 




• Primary purchasers 
and distributors of 
academic research 
• Found in Canada 
• Represented by 
Consortia Canada and 
the Canadian 
Association of 
Research Libraries on 
financial, operational 
and policy issues 




• Free access the most 
cost-effective means of 
providing information 
to patrons 
• Open access best 
realizes the idea of 
making knowledge 
freely available to 
everyone 
• Tight budgets may 
hamper transition to 
free access e.g., 
unable to fund 
infrastructure, IT 
support 
• Cannot individually 





• Large scale; based 
outside of Canada  
• Profits from many 
products and services  
• Owns copyrights to 
many high impact 
journals 
• Open access can allow 
more people to freely 
read academic research. 
 
• Free access can 
undercut profits if 
open access services 





• Small-scale; can be 
non-profit  
• Typically offers small 
number of lower 
impact journals 
• Subscriptions usually 
the primary revenue 
source 
• The idea of making 
knowledge freely 
available to everyone is 




• Free access 
jeopardizes survival if 
subscription revenue 
is lost 
• May not have the 
infrastructure to 




• Represented by the Tri 
Research Councils  
• Offers competitive 
grants to researchers 
and publishers from 
any academic 
discipline 
• All types of research 
are funded 
• Open access can 
improve the provision 
of knowledge, a public 
good 
• The idea of making 
knowledge freely 
available to everyone is 
best realized with open 
access 
• Lack of information 
may prioritize some 
needs at the expense 
of others 
• Unneeded action can 
complicate the market 
failure 
• Policy implications of 
open access transition  
Academics • Diverse group of 
individuals from all 
academic disciplines  
• Easier access to local, 
national and 
international research, 
• Open access perceived 
to interfere with right 
to profit from research 
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• Primary producers of 
research 
• Often fill many roles, 
such as peer review, 
editing and publishing 
• Purchasers of 
academic research 
particularly in the social 
sciences and humanities  
• Useful for health 
practitioners who 





• Research producers 
may bear the full cost 
of publishing their 
work 





• Any private sector 
business, industry, or 
corporation  
• Accessible research can 
spur new innovations  
 
• Spread of easily 
accessed research can 
hurt businesses that 





• Closely linked to and 
may be subsumed 
within private industry 
• Contracts researchers 
for a specific purpose, 
e.g.; medical or 
technological 
advances 
• Accessible research can 
spur new innovations  
• Helps sponsors realize 
goal of dissemination 
and impact 
 
• Freely accessible 
research can undercut 
profit and/or market 
advantage 
 
Research libraries are the primary purchasers and distributors of academic research.19 
These institutions, which are found across Canada, buy subscriptions for print and digital 
literature in all forms from publishers and distribute this material to patrons. These institutions 
are represented by a variety of groups, notably Consortia Canada and the Canadian Association 
of Research Libraries (CARL). Consortia Canada is a national research library consortium 
composed of smaller academic library programs, groups and consortia. This group is actively 
involved in both opening access to digital information, investing in digital infrastructure and 
liaising with other stakeholders to promote the benefits of open access (Consortia Canada 2012).  
This consortium, which has 29 member research libraries, provides policy leadership for its 
members and is the popular face of Canadian research libraries. The consortia and all of its 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 See Consortia Canada (2012) for a complete list of the groups goals, as well as the functions of 
it’s individual members.  
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members favor academic knowledge being freely accessible to everyone for ideological and 
financial reasons (2012).  
The publishers from which research libraries purchase subscriptions are either 
commercial or nonprofit. Commercial publishers publish for profit a variety of material 
including print and digital journals. This industry fills the following functions: establishing the 
ownership of an author’s idea, coordinating peer review, archiving articles for later use, and 
selling academic works to consumers (Ware and Mabe 2009, 13). Over 40% of the journal 
market is currently controlled by Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, Springer, and Taylor & Francis. 
The oligopoly is implicated in using their market advantage to raise journal subscription prices 
beyond what would be expected in a competitive market (Merrett 2008, 96-97). Nonprofit 
publishers fill the same roles as the large publishers, but on a smaller scale. These actors make 
up the majority of the Canadian journal market, generally produce a small amount of lower 
prestige low-impact journals and typically survive on subscription revenue.  
The primary customers of journal publishers are academics. Academics encompass the 
whole spectrum of academic disciplines and include researchers and editors. Researchers are the 
primary producers of research, aggregate research outputs, and control the quality of research 
outputs. Academics often fill multiple, concurrent roles that have both complimentary and 
competing interests. Research active academics simultaneously produce research and/or have 
extensive research histories, edit and prepare peer reviewed documents for publication in all 
formats and participate in the peer review process (Porter 2012, 12-13). The interests of 
publishing researchers include any mix of the following:  publishing in prestigious and/or high 
impact journals, satisfying personal curiosity, generating profit, being recognized for their work, 
contributing to the extant literature, answering questions, solving problems, and gaining tenure. 
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 Journal editors are interested in preparing properly edited material for publication. The 
Canadian Association of Learned Journals (CALJ) is a large, member driven non-profit 
organization that identifies and voices the collective needs of both editors and publishers in a 
variety of academic, industry and policy settings (Canadian Association of Learned Journals 
2012). Research quality is controlled via the peer review system. Peer review frequently occurs 
on a volunteer basis though an informal network of academics.  
Researchers can be funded by public private and/or non-profit sources.. Public funding 
bodies include the Tri Research Council: NSERC, SSHRC) and the CIHR. These institutions are 
responsible for addressing the research funding needs of people from all parts of academia. 
Private funders include any group that uses academic research to gain a market advantage over 
competitors. For example, the pharmaceutical company Pfizer takes part in the public-private 
partnership called the Quebec Consortium for Drug Discovery. This partnership between 
academia, the government and Pfizer aims to create new technologies and testing models that 
increase future product output. This output is designed to be competitive in the market (Lévesque 
2009). Non-profit organizations also fund research from the sciences and humanities. Examples 
include the Heart and Stroke Foundation and the MacArthur Foundation (Heart and Stroke 
Foundation 2014; MacArthur Foundation 2014). 
Funders of each type are primarily interested in receiving the highest return on their 
research investment, with one caveat. Ideally, the returns sought by public investors are for the 
benefit of the public. These returns do not necessarily need to be profitable. This differs for 
private investors, who seek profitable returns on their investments. For example, private 
investment into a new pharmaceutical medicine is done with the anticipation that the medicine 
will eventually generate profit. 
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Underpinning the interests of academics is the concept of academic freedom. The 
capacity for scholars to direct as many aspects of the research and publishing process as possible 
is a key requirement for the smooth functioning of academia (Schonfeld and Housewright, 2010, 
32-33). Some academics have called for publicly funded research to be freely available to 
everyone without the involvement of commercial interests, whereas others argue that commercial 
publishers fill important roles in editing, distribution and access (Porter 2012, 2).   
2.4 Ideas and interests 
Surveying the stakeholders allows us to discern a link between their ideas, interests and 
behaviour. A growing body of literature recognizes that ideas and interests play crucial roles in 
the behaviour and policy preferences of people, as well as in the policy process. Ideas are defined 
as causal beliefs produced by human minds; they connect to the surrounding world via human 
interpretation and aid in problem solving (Béland and Cox 2010, 8). Cause is used in two ways. 
The first is that one event is responsible for producing (causing) a sequence of another event or 
events. The second are links between two or more things that a person believes exists. There are 
two critical ideas in the open access debate. The first idea is that academic knowledge is not 
compatible with toll-gating. The second idea is that this knowledge is compatible with toll-
gating. 
Interests, the strategic behaviours of a person designed to reach some goal, are a type of 
idea. The two critical interests in the open access debate are money and prestige. There is debate 
on the nature of the relationship between ideas and interests. Some scholars argue that interests 
exist only after a person defines them. These definitions can be influenced by politics, ideals, 
beliefs, emotions, history and so on. Other scholars think that interests have an “objective 
existence independent of the person who holds them” (ibid., 10). In this case cognitions, and thus 
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ideas, are of minor importance. In this chapter, I assume that ideas are a significant part of 
stakeholder interests and that interests do not exist independent of its holder. All of the ideas and 
interests to be discussed are found above in Table 1.  
I discuss ideas first. The first proposition is that the free movement of knowledge 
provides general benefits; restrictions reduce the availability of intellectual capital. This 
proposition manifests in the argument that knowledge should be treated as if it were a public 
good that should not be toll-gated.20 Publicly funded research should be fundamentally 
incompatible with generating revenue and/or profit. Stated another way, the ideal way that access 
should be granted is through the author-pays system.  
The second proposition is that restricting the flow of knowledge is acceptable. That is, 
publicly funded academic knowledge is a public good that is compatible with toll gating. The 
first criterion for knowledge being toll gated is financial. This is identical to what happens in an 
oligopolistic and competitive market. Some journals survive on access fees, whereas others 
generate profit from these fees. In both cases, charging toll fees is built on the assumption that 
any member of the research cycle has the freedom to seek revenue and/or profit from their 
research.  
Making people pay to access this public good has produced a tension that can be 
interpreted as a clash of ideas. That is, the ideas that underlay the open access debate are not the 
same. Such a clash implies that the idea of treating publicly funded research as a public good is 
mutually exclusive with the idea of toll-gating knowledge. Indeed, these differing ideas are an 
important generator of the various arguments. All else being equal, if all of the stakeholders had 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#6!The criterion for knowledge being a public good is whether or not tax dollars was used to fund 
a given project. !
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identical values and perspectives, then debates on open access would lack an ideational 
dimension.   
I now discuss interests. Academics are primarily concerned with prestige and research 
impact. These interests manifest as a culture that is conservative and resistant to change. The 
rewards system in academia, particularly tenure and promotion, is an important cause of this 
resistance. Academics have an incentive to avoid any change that could interfere with gaining 
tenure and promotion. For example, academics prefer to publish in the most prestigious and 
high-impact journals, no matter the cost. (Porter 2012, 13). A government policy that limits or 
jeopardizes this freedom may be met with resistance. This possibility was reflected during an 
interview, when an anonymous participant who was asked about government involvement in 
academic affairs noted that “its important that scholars have academic freedom. The federal 
government should not be more involved.M! 
For academics and non-profit publishers, the importance of toll gating highlights their 
need to find revenue as a means of survival. Academic libraries face similar financial constraints, 
but do not have the freedom to impose access fees on their customers. Instead, the rationally self-
interested arguments of libraries reduce to liaising with the government and large publishers to 
find ways to ease the burden on library budgets.  
Commercial publishers, by contrast, are interested in maintaining profit margins. Parts of 
the open access debate require changes to the current publishing system.  Assuming that these 
publishers do not adapt to changes in academic publishing, then moving to a new status quo 
could be against their rational self-interest. If they adapted to these changes, and evidence 
suggests that they are, then a new status quo could align with their financial interests (Porter 
2012, 2-3). 
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An important consideration is that ideas and interests are not mutually exclusive 
concepts. They interact in a variety of ways to guide behaviour and policy preferences. Nearly all 
of the stakeholders on every side of the debate prioritize financial interests for a variety of 
justifiable reasons. These interests have, in turn, informed stakeholder behaviour, policy 
preferences and policy implementation. Commercial publishers are interested in profit, and 
monetizing opening access is viewed as a profitable business opportunity. 
 Non-profit publishers express concern over losing subscription revenue during and after 
any transition. In a market that has not adapted to open access developments, this is not 
surprising. During an interview, senior policy advisor from one of the research councils who 
chose to remain anonymous highlighted this sentiment when asked about the financial state of 
the journal market: “It has to be paid for, the money has to come from somewhere. . . A journal 
like Cell charges $40,000 a year for a subscription; everyone knows that’s absurd. That’s not 
how much it costs to produce the journal.” 
The importance of financial interests does not, however, imply that ideas are absent in the 
open access discussion. These concepts interact such that ideas can influence interests and 
interests can influence ideas. Some actors think that open access models are both ideal cost-
control measures and the most practical way to realize the building of a “marketplace for ideas”. 
This argument has broad appeal; for example, Consortia Canada, CARL and CALJ have used 
this argument when debating the merits of transition. 
A different example of the interplay between ideas and interests is found on the other end 
of the debate. Some researchers and publishers of all types, despite agreeing with the value of 
making knowledge easily accessible, think that the current system of research access is meeting 
their interests. Researchers who have the freedom to publish in prestigious journals want, in part, 
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to raise their profile among the academic community. Upsetting this system could hinder the 
efforts of these researchers to be well-known within their field. During an interview, open access 
expert Michael Geist21 highlighted this sentiment by saying that “Academics have supported the 
[traditional publishing] system due in part to reputational benefits and the absence of viable 
alternatives.” 
Financially viable publishing alternatives have, at their core, a self-interested component. 
The balance of ideas and interests that underpin reputational benefits, however, is more complex. 
At first glance, an academic who chooses to publish in a prestigious journal appears to be 
motivated solely by her own interests. Publishing in such a journal both builds reputation and 
contributes to the academics’ drive for tenure and promotion. Being promoted relies in part on an 
academics’ reputation; therefore, academics need to be interested in their reputation. The “scale 
of ideas and interests” tips toward self-interest. From another perspective, the value of freely 
accessible knowledge is replaced by the values of being recognized by peers and the host 
institution.  
The complex interplay of ideas and interests is also present at the level of policy creation 
and implementation. That is, these two broad concepts are not exclusive to stakeholders. When 
asked about the ways that the value of making academic research freely accessible affects policy 
building during an interview, an anonymous consultant who took part in a variety of policy 
discussions at the granting agencies and CARL noted that the desire to build open access policies 
was motivated by ideas-based rather than interests-based arguments: “I think that that [the idea 
of freely accessible research] resonates especially at the government level, so the funding 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 I interviewed Michael Geist, who is a Canada Research Chair of Internet and E-Commerce law 
at the University of Ottawa.  
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agencies. So it has a huge role in convincing funding agencies in implementing open access 
policies.” 
The idea of freely accessible research resonates with these policymakers because publicly 
funded research is produced using tax dollars. The participant above noted that well-constructed 
arguments that incorporate the idea of accessible research are powerful means of persuading the 
research councils to implement open access policies. These policies take the form of increased 
financial support for researchers who lack the money to publish in open access journals and/or 
commercial or non-profit journals that offer open access services. This is not surprising, as 
applying purely interest-based arguments to public goods issues are not necessarily convincing. 
Monetizing and profiting from public goods is often not sustainable, as was the case with the 
privatization of the British railway system (van Vugt 1997). 
The funding agencies also do not have sufficient influence alone to lobby the government 
for more funding. There is a divide between the desire of the granting agencies to implement 
open access policies and the willingness of governments to financially support open access 
intervention. If academics and librarians jointly lobbied the government using arguments based 
on ideas and interests, then this divide could be bridged. Indeed, the federal government has said 
that funding will gradually be diverted towards projects that have more tangible uses by industry 
(Geist 2013).  
2.5 Discussion 
The funding agencies have heard and made many arguments on implementing open 
access policies. The government is receptive to these discussions and developments. For 
example, the SSHRC has implemented a “green” open access policy for research data and the 
CIHR has a mandatory open access policy for research data and publications. Though these 
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discussions are a continuing process, Canada has not been a leader on the issue. Other countries, 
notably Great Britain, have taken steps to integrate author-pays systems into the publishing 
market.  
The government can use the policies from other countries as blueprints for action. Doing 
so, however, is not a simple matter. Taking immediate and comprehensive action on the open 
access issue is akin to prompting a sudden paradigm shift (Coleman, Skogstad and Atkinson 
1997). Such a new “public policy paradigm” entails a change in the fiscal priorities of a 
government. In Canada, the government would need to restructure the ways in which access to 
publicly funded research is viewed. Such a shift could emerge if factors such as political will and 
strong lobby efforts aligned at the right time.  
Some academics and librarians who support the open access idea are dissatisfied with the 
current policy environment. Concern is still being voiced over the status quo and the government 
is being pressed to implement policies that foster the development of the open access ideal. 
Pushing for this ideal requires a public policy paradigm shift away from the status quo. The 



















THE STATUS QUO 
The goal of this chapter is to lay the groundwork for a public goods case for government 
intervention. This goal will be met by describing the following parts of the status quo: Market 
structure, business models used, the presence of a market failure, and the link between journal 
price and access to knowledge. Describing the status quo is an important step in outlining the 
ramifications of a widespread “gold” open access model. In other words, determining whether or 
not open access is the ideal means of knowledge dissemination is only possible by comparing 
“what is” to “what could or should be”.  
First, a broad description of the market is given from a Canadian point of view. The flow 
of public money from the granting agencies to commercial publishers, via the proxy of publicly 
funded research, composes this section. The cost and permission barriers built into the market are 
also highlighted. Viewing the market in this way gives policymakers a backdrop against which 
policy options can be discussed. Several business models are then presented and discussed. The 
rapid growth of open access has forced universities, research libraries and academics to find new 
ways to determine who pays what cost. Research libraries and universities have a particularly 
strong financial incentive to find a new payment method. Paying subscription fees, the primary 
means of doing business, are only one way that academic research is made accessible. All of the 
known models are compared and contrasted along five dimensions: cost, who pays, who uses the 
model, payment sources, and large-scale sustainability.22  
 I argue that the market is failing to supply a public good at an economically efficient 
level. This failure is established by comparing two microeconomic models to existing real-world 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!##!The author-pays system (open access journals and repositories) is described in chapter two and 
is not reproduced here. !
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quantitative and qualitative data. Economic models are useful for depicting market failures, as 
well as the impact that changing the price and/or quantity of a good has on the supply of and 
demand for that good. This is particularly helpful in showing that prices in the journal market are 
restricting access to some research. A discussion on the impact of the market failure on the 
stakeholders concludes this sub-section.  
A discussion of the relationship between subscription prices and knowledge accessibility 
follows. This discussion proceeds by first showing how changing prices affect accessibility to 
academic knowledge. A conceptual model of this link is combined with interview quotes and 
real-world data. Finally, connections are drawn between this relationship and ideas and interests.  
3.1 Market structure 
Four European-based commercial publishers control over 40% of the global market in 
academic journals (Porter 2011 pp. 5). These publishers are Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, Springer, 
and Taylor & Francis. This type of structure is termed an oligopoly. An oligopoly is a 
relationship between at least two firms that exert control a market. An oligopolistic market is not 
perfectly competitive, as the firms have sufficient power to set prices at which goods or services 
are sold. This control manifests in the journal market as, for example, the setting of subscription 
and APC prices. A monopoly, by contrast, is a market controlled by one firm. If one commercial 
publisher began buying the other publishers, then a monopolized market would emerge. In other 
words, a monopolized journal market is a possible endpoint that the current oligopoly could 
move toward.   
There is, however, a nationalist perspective on this market structure. A Canadian 
customer could justifiably argue that the oligopoly is harmful. The case of a Canadian research 
library illustrates the nationalist perspective. First, public granting agencies award both 
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academics and research libraries money to conduct research, purchase journal subscriptions, 
publish in academic journals, and upgrade research infrastructure. This money comes from the 
granting agencies and federal transfers to provincial advanced education ministries. The granting 
agencies award money directly to successful research applicants who then produce research 
using all or part of their award.  
These researchers then give the copyrights of their work to publishers inside and outside 
of Canada. Giving these copyrights to a European commercial publisher means that the rights to 
a publicly funded research output from Canada are owned by a European business. A library that 
wants to access this research must pay a fee. The money that the library uses is public. In other 
words, the library is using Canadian tax dollars to access research that was generated using 
Canadian tax dollars.  
3.1.1 Business models 
 Determining whether or not this market structure is desirable is complicated by a lack of 
other competitive and sustainable large-scale business models. If a sustainable alternative to the 
subscription model exists, then rational self-interest suggests that this alternative model would be 
adopted by a capable actor and used in the free market. That no such model is being used on the 
large scale suggests that either the stakeholders are uninformed about existing models or no 
model exists. If the actors are uninformed, then the customers are paying a higher cost for goods 
and services that someone else could provide at a lower price.  
That any of the stakeholders are uninformed about other ways of doing business is 
unlikely. Necessity has forced the granting agencies, libraries and academics to seek new ways to 
allocate resources. There is also a growing body of literature describing different business 
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There are several defining characteristics of these business models. One difference is the 
payment source. In all cases, funding sources are public, private or a mix of both. For example, 
institutional subsidies provided to academics can be funded purely by private investment or 
donations, from granting agency awards only or a mix of each. Some journals also sell their 
copyrighted work to other publishers. Toll gating exclusively uses subscriptions as the cost. Hard 
copy sales and consortia use a mix of subscriptions and APCs, whereas every other model uses 
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Article Processing Charges.23 Customers pay subscriptions to access copyrighted research and 
authors or representatives of these authors pay a processing charge to publish their work 
accessible. Subscriptions are demonstrably economically sustainable, assuming that the costs do 
not rise so high as to force consumers to find alternative access routes.  
Community publishing entails academics banding together into small groups to publish 
their work (OASIS 2012). These academics are found in all of academia, although the arts and 
humanities are the primary disciplines. These non-profit publishers conduct business by relying 
on volunteers to do the bulk of the work. Manuscripts are uploaded on the Internet to be freely 
accessed. Subscriptions are occasionally charged for hard copy versions of these manuscripts.  
Publishers use mixtures of the models, whether their goal is to generate revenue or not. 
For example, commercial publishers use subscriptions and processing charges to gain profit. 
Individual academics do not have the capacity to manage repositories and typically manage 
subscription journals only. Institutions and commercial publishers, however, have the required 
infrastructure to manage repositories. Consortium purchasing and institutional subsidies are 
discussed as parts of the author-pays system. 
3.2 “Is there a market failure?”  - Linking models to data 
So far, only overviews of the market and how business is conducted have been discussed. 
What has not been established is whether or not the market has failed. Some commentators have 
suggested that the high prices charged by commercial publishers are a sign of a market failure; 
others argue that commercial publishers fill roles that justify the costs (Taylor 2012, Porter 
2012). Identifying the presence of a market failure is important from a public policy perspective. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 These charges are part of the author-pays system. 
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One of the roles of the government is to intervene into failed markets, assuming that intervening 
creates conditions for the stakeholders to find a new Pareto improved equilibrium24.  
The figure below depicts the demand for accessing some number of research articles at 
some price. In one case, customers buy access from a large commercial publisher that dictates 
quantity and price. The other case depicts demand in a competitive market. Consider the 
following model. 
 
Figure 2 Demand for accessing research articles in monopolistic and competitive markets.  
The number of articles accessed is on the horizontal axis and access prices are on the 
vertical axis. Assume that articles have fixed quality. This is justified because fixed quality 
simplifies illustration and interpretation. Varying quality would shift the demand line either to 
the left or the right. Researchers accessing lower quality articles would shift the curve to the left, 
whereas accessing higher quality articles would shift the curve to the right.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Pareto improvements are instances where changing the allocation of a good or service makes 
at least one person better off and does not make anyone worse off. 
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Also assume that demand is downward sloping. This assumption is justified in two ways. 
First, a given researcher’s decision to access research are subject to diminishing marginal 
returns; that is, she will find progressively less use for accessing additional articles. She will 
eventually stop accessing articles when no utility is gained. Second, researchers value the articles 
differently. Some researchers are willing to pay any price to access articles, whereas others will 
pay up to a given point. Aggregating all of these behaviours results in a downward sloping 
demand line.  
The red dot E* is the economically efficient outcome. Economic output is maximized at 
this point. Economic output is defined as the quantity of research articles accessed for some 
price. This point rests on the intersection of the demand line and marginal cost MC line at $0 per 
accessed article.25 If the market were competitive, both the marginal cost of access and the 
amount customers would be willing to pay would be equal to the marginal cost of access.  
The blue square E**, by contrast, is the point where customers are willing to pay a price 
Pm to access Qm articles. The commercial publisher sets price Pm. The number of articles 
accessed at Pm is the point Qm. The dashed MR line is marginal revenue, which depicts revenue 
that the publisher gains from selling one additional unit of access. Note the differences between 
the price and quantity in the commercial publisher case and the competitive case. An allocative 
inefficiency called the deadweight loss, which is depicted by the green triangle, results from this 
difference. Consider the following example where Pm = 25, MC = $5, Qc = 6, and Qm = 3. Using 
the formula !(base*height) yields !(3*20) = $30 economic benefit lost by customers who 
access these articles.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 The actual marginal cost, though negligible, is likely not zero.   
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There is strong evidence that the blue dot E** accurately depicts the buying and selling 
behaviours of academic libraries and the largest commercial publishers. From 1985 to 2001, the 
average real subscription prices charged for the top 10 commercial journals increased by 379% 
from $286 to $1372 (Bergstrom 2001, 8). Journals owned by professional societies and 
university presses, however, increased an average of $104 to $187, an 80% increase over the 
same time period (Ibid., 4). In 2001, the average real price per page charged by the 10 most-cited 
commercial publishers was nearly six times higher than what the 10 most-cited nonprofit 
publishers charged. The average price per citation charged by commercial publishers was even 
higher, being about 16 times greater than nonprofit publisher prices (ibid.). These drastic price 
increases are significant because these publishers own a variety of high-impact and high prestige 
journals. The demand for these materials is very high. That is, academics and academic 
institutions routinely purchase subscriptions for access that is perceived to be indispensable. 
Over 8, 000 researchers from around the world have responded to these high prices by 
actively boycotting Elsevier. This response takes the form of researchers signing a petition and 
consenting to making their name and boycotting activities publicly available. High subscription 
costs, publishing low-quality research and support of legislation that restricts open access 
initiatives are cited as motivations for this boycott (Gower and Neylon 2012). In Canada, these 
high prices force librarians to cancel subscriptions. The choices that these libraries must make to 
cover these cost gaps are part of a system of trade-offs. A librarian responsible for buying 





It is usually the big commercial publishers that have unreasonable subscription prices . . 
Wiley is the publisher that is top of my mind right now . . . What always decides the 
case lately is cost. Our serials fund is completely spent out across the Library (i.e. all 
disciplines), in order to acquire anything new we must cancel something else, or transfer 
money from another fund. 
 
The librarian is forced to drop some subscriptions, prepare to drop journal titles in the 
future and/or transfer money from a different fund to pay for the required journals. The first two 
decisions result in either an immediate or delayed loss of knowledge access for the consumers. 
Note Table 3,26 which shows the most recently available acquisitions expenditures data for 


















UBC 982,000 10,480, 000 3,400,000 3,200,000 18,000,000 13,670,000 
SFU 352,000 3,600, 000 2,000,000 1,100,000 7, 200,000 8,575,400 
Usask 94, 000 7, 000, 000 1, 800,000 1, 100,000 10, 400,000 9, 580,000 
Manitoba 513,000 4,700, 000 1,340,000 2, 500,000 9,100,000 9,090,000 
Regina 300,000 1,998,000 637,200 320, 000 3,250,000 3,246,000 
Brock 148,700 1,930,500 430,500 135, 000 2,600,000 2,500,000 
Carleton 34,800 3,753,000 709,000 584,700 5,000,000 6,064,000 
McMaster 219,000 6,113,000 1,000,000 848,400 8,200,000 9,205,000 
Ottawa  5,700,000 4, 600,000 2,220,000 12,500,000 15,258,000 
Queen's  6,700,000 1,400,000 1,388,000 9,493,600 10,377,000 
Ryerson 111,000 2,511,000 1,100,000 416,160.40 4,143,000 3,852,000 
Western 
Ontario  8,411,000 2,177,300 1,377,000 11,900,000 13,900,000 
Windsor 394,000 3,492,000 584,000 575,800 5,000,000 4,440,000 
Note. Green highlighted institutions had acquisition costs > budget. Sixteen members were excluded 
due to missing more than one data point.  
 
In 2012, the subscription costs of electronic serials took up the bulk of the expenses in 
every library. In some cases, electronic serials subscriptions accounted for ~50% -75% of a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#'!N/@/!@/5>.!H4+-!>/C:!;.<@;@=@;+.O<!K>P<;@>A!Q+.@/C@!@:>!/=@:+4!H+4!@:>!0/@/A!
27 Monographs data is included for the sake of completion. 
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libraries’ total expenses. In six institutions, total expenditures even exceeded their allocated 
budgets (highlighted in green).  
3.3 Linking price to public goods access 
So far, a connection between subscription pricing and accessibility to academic 
knowledge has been assumed. This section will show how price dictates accessibility. Consider 
the following figure, which depicts the conceptual relationship between journal prices and the 
demand for some quantity of journals: 
 
Figure 3 Relationship between subscription price and demand for journals.  
Assume that demand is linear. The figure shows that the quantity of journals demanded 
and subscription prices are inversely related. First, consumers demand some quantity of journals 
at some price. Quantity of journals is shown on the horizontal axis and journal prices are shown 
on the vertical axis. As prices increase, demand for journals decreases and vice versa. For 
example, a research library could purchase a subscription to one journal at a total cost of $45. 
Another research library could purchase subscriptions to two journals at a total cost of $30. 
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Now consider the case where a journal subscription costs $60. The quantity of journals 
demanded by a research library is zero. In other words, no research library would be able to 
access the journal due to the high price. If prices are too high, then accessibility to the journal(s) 
is low or absent. For example, this scenario could emerge if a commercial publisher charged 
subscription prices that were too high for any customer to buy.  
3.4 Discussion 
The status quo has gradually become too costly for libraries, academics and non-profit 
publishers to manage. High subscription prices charged by commercial publishers have driven 
this development. These prices are pushing libraries to either drop journal subscriptions or find 
other modes of purchasing. Canceling subscriptions implies that research that would otherwise 
be made available to consumers is rendered inaccessible. Stated another way, the accessibility of 
a public good is closed off. In the case of Canadian research libraries, the demand for the most 
impactful or prestigious journals is only met by jeopardizing other programs or acquisitions. This 
drop in either funding or subscriptions is reminiscent of figure two such that the high cost of 
some subscriptions results in a drop in accessing research articles.  
Whether or not the status quo is ideal depends on the stakeholder in question. Some 
academics and publishers use rational self-interest as the guiding principle for their decisions. 
The status quo gives these actors the best opportunities to act on and fulfill this principle.  
Academics that value the prestige associated with publishing in top journals are hesitant to 
support an equilibrium shift that jeopardizes these benefits. Commercial publishers, who reap 
large profits at the expense of consumers, similarly support the status quo in order to maintain 
their profit margins.  
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The status quo could also be the most sustainable option. In other words, oligopolistic 
and competitive behaviours can be viable at large scales if the deadweight loss is minimized. If 
this is the case, then the status quo may be the most rational financial self-interested choice. If 
the other business models are not economically viable, have unknown viability or force 
stakeholders to change their behaviour in undesirable ways, then the demonstrable success of 
subscriptions may render the status quo ideal. Whether or not this arrangement is “the best”, 
however, is not clear. Some academics and librarians that value the idea of freely accessible 
knowledge more than rational self-interest do not consider any status quo characterized by toll 
gating as ideal. This is particularly the case if the toll gates are expensive.  
In response to these costs, a joint Canadian Association of Research Libraries/Canadian 
Research Knowledge Network (CARL-CRKN) open access working group recently concluded 
that implementing open access initiatives on the national stage was the next step to control costs 
and offered several recommendations to this end (Owen, B., Blay, J., Clapperton, M., Godolphin, 
J., Hannaford, J., et al. 2012). The recommendations focus on the need to define what open 
access means to the different stakeholders, to find a financially sustainable national model and to 
build relationships with public policymakers, commercial vendors and other stakeholders as a 
means of managing costs and advocating for open access.  
To date, no group has taken individual action to “get the ball rolling”.28 There are 
legitimate reasons, often financial, for inaction. For example, research libraries are often 
constrained by tight budgets resulting in little money being invested in open access initiatives; 
conversely, commercial vendors have not taken steps to lower prices. Fritz Pannekoek, the 
current president of the CALJ, paints a grim picture of the future of the Canadian market and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 This lack of individual action is formally known as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a concept 
explored in Chapter four. 
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Social Sciences and Humanities journals in particular if the status quo is maintained: “What will 
happen, the academic journal market in Canada, the Canadian journals-Canadian-grown journals 
will be marginalized. That’s what I think will happen, simply because there’s no financial 
support. There will be a few little bright spots, but generally Canadian Humanities and Social 
Sciences will be marginalized.” 
As previously mentioned, the Canadian journal market is primarily composed of smaller 
publishers that survive on subscription revenue and government support. Fritz Pannekoek argued 
that publishers in the social sciences and humanities might lose subscription revenue as 
customers increasingly seek freely accessible research on the Internet. Without sufficient 
government financial support, this change could result in the SSH diminishing in size, scope and 
impact. This is particularly problematic for the SSH due to both the ways in which SSH literature 
is used and the relative incompatibility of SSH with open access compared to their Natural 
Science, Medicine and Technology (STM) counterparts. Social Sciences and Humanities 
literature generally has a longer shelf life relative to their STM counterparts, where new 
discoveries in the STM disciplines more often render past work obsolete or less useful than SSH 
work (Porter 2012, 1-3).  
Early collaborations among concerned stakeholders yielded Synergies, a nonprofit 
organization that produced an online database designed to publish and disseminate only SSH 
literature via open access journals. The hope was that the Synergies infrastructure would be 
sufficient to improve access to SSH literature. This goal was to be reached by preserving 
documents, indexing, aggregating research, and offering consumers free access to the Synergies 
database. Unfortunately, this goal has been not fully met. During the course of the interview, the 
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same Fritz Pannekoek noted that he was a prominent leader behind the building of Synergies and 
stated that the program, 
 
Sort of made it in part, but didn’t make it far enough, and one of the key outcomes of 
Synergies was supposed to be the development of a business model which would see 
digital journals morph into open access journals. But someone had to come up with a 
business model that might work first. Most journals in Canada, particularly in the 
Humanities and Social Sciences are grossly underfunded. Most of them are extremely 
fragile and are run off the desktop. Most of these journals are, I would say, well-
intentioned amateurs.  
 
 
A goal of launching Synergies was to experiment with ways to transform digital journals 
into financially viable open access journals. Unfortunately, Synergies was launched without a 
sufficient budget. The Synergies program tried to “get the ball rolling” by having underfunded 
stakeholders take joint action. The result was failure. 
The power difference between commercial publishers and their customers makes price 
reduction unlikely. The publishers have no incentive to price fairly. Indeed, they have incentives 
to integrate emerging open access publishing modes into their business models. If incentives are 
insufficient to change this behaviour, then the impetus to change falls on every other stakeholder 
who wants a new status quo. No actor aside from commercial publishers has the power to 
unilaterally create a new status quo. The attempt by Synergies illustrates this fact. That 
commercial publishers are not taking action requires that authors, non-commercial publishers, 







WHAT DOES OPEN ACCESS TRANSITION ENTAIL? 
Chapter three described “what is”, and this chapter covers “what could/ought to be”. The 
goal of this chapter is to analyze the consequences of transitioning to a widespread author-pays 
system as well as detail what is needed for this to happen. Reaching an open access world is not 
a simple matter. This move, which entails a variety of complex and interconnected changes to 
the status quo, is not uniformly good (or bad) for everyone. This chapter therefore starts with a 
broad overview and discussion of the impact that transition would have on the current publishing 
system.  
What follows is a systematic description of and comparison among three journal market 
systems: oligopoly, competitive and author-pays. The model in Figure four on page 56 depicts 
who pays a given price for some quantity of journals within two status quo markets and an 
author-pays open access market. Such an interpretation is needed to concisely show why moving 
to an author-pays system requires a significant level of cooperation. Finally, I discuss what is 
needed for the actors to implement an author-pays system. Game Theory concepts are used to 
inform this section. Game Theory is particularly useful in depicting the conditions under which 
cooperation may or may not emerge. An explanation of why this change will not happen without 
government action concludes the chapter.  
Implicit within all of the sections are changes in stakeholder behaviour provoked by 
transition. Behaviour is defined as the routine decisions and actions engaged in by the actors. 
Recognizing that transition will change behaviour from the status quo is justified because 
predicting these changes before implementing any large-scale policy can identify points at which 
the policy could fail. Ideally, a public policy will survive over a long time period. Not identifying 
as many stable patterns of behaviour as possible after transition could lead to scenarios where the 
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policy fails to achieve the desired outcomes or produces undesirable outcomes. As a result, such 
failures can render the policy open to change or removal. 
4.1 Changes to the publishing system 
 A variety of significant changes to the publishing system would occur if a national 
repository and/or open access journal model is implemented. The table below compares these 
models along eight dimensions: Peer review, prestige, copyright ownership, accessibility, 




Comparison of open access models  
 “Green” open access (no 
delay) 
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There are similarities and variations among these models. Take, for example, the 
matter of peer review. Repository administrators do not peer review articles that are 
uploaded. Peer review may or may not be done on a deposited article. Publishers of peer 
reviewed journals, however, require peer review as a condition of publication. Prestige 
depends on the quality and impact of published and deposited articles. Both models are 
relatively new to the market. Time is needed for open repositories and open journals to 
develop prestigious reputations. Open journals are particularly sensitive to prestige 
issues, as a given journal must also compete for readers against established print journals. 
Poorly peer reviewed research that is published can hurt the prestige of the journal. 
Repositories that primarily or solely hold research articles that are thoroughly peer 
reviewed before deposit could be deemed prestigious. On the other hand, a repository 
could be perceived to have low prestige if the indexed research is low quality.  
Academic freedom remains largely unchanged with open access journals. A small 
difference, however, may come from the ”when” and “where” an article is deposited. 
Delaying uploads could be a barrier to an author’s academic freedom by limiting how an 
author makes her work accessible. Consider the case of an open access proponent who 
publishes research. This author may want to make her work immediately accessible. 
Many publishers also stipulate where a research article can be deposited, such as an 
institutional repository or personal website. 
Repositories are more sustainable than open journals by having lower transaction 
and operating costs (Commissioned report 2011). The risk of using either of the 
repository models is minimal. If journals charged APCs that were high enough to push 
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authors away, then transition risks would be high. The model would be unsustainable 
over a time period determined by how many journals charged high APCs. Conversely, 
risks would be lower if APCs were low (2011).  
Financial sustainability, transition costs and transition risks are interconnected 
issues. Financial risk is shouldered if transition is costly. Moving to an author-pays 
system without establishing who pays what cost in what amount may render the change 
unsustainable. Conversely, switching to author-pays after “having all the pieces in place” 
i.e., having willing and able funders, limits risk and improves sustainability.  
Potential revenue loss for non-profit publishers is a possible outcome from 
moving to an open access world. Assume that consumers will not be willing to pay any 
subscription price in an author-pays system. If more research is made freely accessible, 
then Canadian publishers that rely solely on subscription revenue may need to seek out 
more international publishing options.. Publishers that extract some fees from authors, 
however, may survive. This survival depends on the quality of the product that the 
publisher offers. Those publishers that offer high quality products are likely to have 
enough subscribers to survive. 
When asked about a major hurdle to be overcome before a national open access 
model could be implemented, an experienced consultant who has worked with library 
consortia and the research councils noted the following: 
 
I mean if you think of a national open access model, probably helping the 
smaller publishers transition … a lot of the Canadian publishers are very small 
and they would need some support to change their business model. So SSHRC 
has an open access fund for journals and … would probably have to provide 
more support than they are already doing … helping the smaller journal 




This consultant voiced concerns that small non-profit and for-profit Canadian 
publishers and their journals, notably in the Social Sciences and Humanities, will face 
potential revenue losses during a transition. If Canadian publishers are not financially 
supported during transition, then a shrinking of the Canadian journal market is possible. 
If these journals were to disappear, then Canadian researchers would have fewer 
Canadian outlets to have their work distributed. A consequence of this minimizing is that 
Canadian researchers who want their work to be distributed to as many people as possible 
would lose those opportunities.  
On the other hand, the easing of access barriers opens new avenues for Canadian 
research to hit the international stage. Even if all Canadian print journals disappeared, 
researchers could still self-publish their work on the Internet. As a consequence, 
academics and non-academics around the globe with Internet access would have 
opportunities to easily access Canadian research that was put in repositories or open 
journals. This increased readership is called the Open Access Citation Effect (Harnad and 
Brody 2004, 1). This effect refers to the increase in citations of OA articles relative to 
citations for non-OA articles. This effect is particularly important to Social Sciences and 
Humanities researchers, who would have more opportunities to have their work easily 
accessible and, presumably, more widely read29. Though the Canadian journal market 
may shrink, access to Canadian research could increase.  
Eliminating access fees does not imply that production costs vanish. Costs shift 
instead of disappear. An author who chooses to publish in journal that may or may not be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Look and Marsh (2012) outline further benefits of open access. 
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open potentially faces thousands of dollars in processing charges. Table five below lists 
APCs charged by three popular conventional and three open access publishers: 
Table 5 
 
Article Processing Charges per submission and journal type for commercial 
and open access publishers; post-negotiation* 
 APC cost ($USD) Journal type 
Elsevier  $500 - $5000  All types 
Sage  $1800 - $3000  STM, SSH 
Wiley-Blackwell  $3000  STM, SSH 
PLoS  $1350 - $2900  All types 
Biomed Central $1280 - $2565  STM 
MDPI Free - $1905.17  All types 
*Note: Purple is commercial publishing and green is open access publishing.  
 
Paying for these APCs can be difficult, and sometimes impossible, for some 
researchers. Researchers with sufficient money may be disinclined to publish in open 
access journals if APCs are too high. There are, however, still ways for unfunded or 
underfunded researchers to have their articles published. For example, an author from and 
underdeveloped country can have his APC charges waived (Elsevier 2014).30 There are 
also several business models designed to pay for APCs. Consider universities, which 
currently pay for research with library subscriptions. In an open access world, these 
subscription costs may shrink. If this happens, then universities will have excess money 
that could be devoted to paying APCs. Collective agreements, for example, could 
stipulate that employers pay some amount of money to cover publishing fees.  
Note that the private firm pricings are not drastically different from open access 
journal pricing. One possibility is that the oligopoly is not raising prices in excess of what !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$6!R/;L>4<!/4>!0>@>4-;.>0!+.!/!on a case-by-case basis. !
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would be found in a competitive market. If this is true, then the higher prices may reflect 
what is needed to pay for required technological and human resources. Commercial 
publishers may actually be matching or nearly matching the prices set by open access 
journal publishers. As a consequence, oligopoly pricing tactics may not be the problem.   
On the other hand, the oligopoly has access to an economy of scale. 
Administrators of open access journals do not.  As a consequence, open access publishers 
may need to inflate their prices to cover journal production costs. If open access was 
more widespread, these producers may be able to lower their prices. Assuming that 
commercial publishers did not lower their prices to stay competitive, price differences 
could become more apparent.  
 Making research freely accessible also affects stakeholders outside of academia. 
Fulton (1997) details the unsustainable increasing returns to scale that firms face when 
copyrighted knowledge (a toll good) used as a key input into their production function 
becomes freely accessible (a public good). Stated another way, businesses that rely on 
formerly copyrighted knowledge to function will be unable to cover its costs. This 
scenario applies to sectors that rely on IPR-protected production inputs, such as software 
companies that make use of certain technologies and agricultural businesses that use 
knowledge that improves crop-breeding efficiency.  
 Also, if free access persists over the long-term, then the host nation can expect 
some rate of return over time. Returns can take many forms, from technological advances 
to universities increasing their competitiveness on the international stage. Underpinning 
this argument, however, is the assumption that returns and freely accessible research are 
positively and causally related. That is, every one unit of freely accessed research 
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generates a positive return.  
 Making the above connection, however, is difficult at best. First, free access does 
not necessarily equate to useful access. The “publish or perish” environment has resulted 
in an explosion of research, some of which is of questionable quality (Cole and Cole 
1967; Fabio, Fausto and Maurizio 2007). If some published research is not useful, then 
free access is not always useful. Some research across all of academia is demonstrably 
poor and practically useless (Bauerlein, Gad-el-Hak, Grody et al. 2010).  
 All else being equal, free accessibility to poor research confers no benefits and 
produces no returns. The quality of other research, however, is less obvious and relies on 
strong peer review. In these cases, research is useful if there is trust between the 
researcher and the peer review system. The usefulness of research is severely undermined 
if peer review does not filter out incompetent work. Therefore, having free access to all 
research is not always useful if some research is not used. 
 A lack of constant usefulness implies that any returns connected to free access will 
eventually taper off. Even if all freely accessible research were high quality, diminishing 
marginal utility would still apply. Every additional unit of research that is freely 
accessed, regardless of discipline, will not confer consistently positive returns. For 
example, the short shelf life of STM (science, technology, mathematics) and technical 
research (~5 to 10 years) implies that STM knowledge has limited reuse value in the 
long-term. This research is prone to losing utility over time by becoming outdated or 
obsolete (Porter 2012). This loss of usefulness is inevitable, as formerly cutting-edge 
research often becomes a so-called “stepping stone” on which new discoveries are made. 
A need to innovate and find novel solutions to old and emerging problems thus renders 
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the accessing of the same articles less useful over time.   
 Research in the SSH share similar, though not identical, traits to STM research. 
Low quality research is also found in the SSH, which implies that free access to poor 
and/or useless SSH research is also useless. Unlike the STM disciplines, however, 
research in the SSH has a shelf life of ~20 years (Porter 2012). This diverse base of 
research usually takes more time to lose value or become obsolete. This extended 
window of “usefulness” has implications for the diminishing marginal utility of free 
access. If STM research remains useful over a longer time, and access to this research is 
free, then free access is also useful access. The diminishing marginal utility of free access 
to properly peer reviewed research thus emerges later in time. Once the research loses 
usefulness, then the utility of free access will also drop.   
4.2 Comparing author-pays to monopoly and competition 
Proponents of the open access ideal desire a change from the status quo. 
Implementing an author-pays system free of all access barriers for consumers, however, 
is not simple. Reaching this new equilibrium must take account of costs that are not 
immediately visible. Consider the model below.  
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Figure 4 Research article access costs in monopoly, competitive and author-pays 
systems. 
This graph shows that, no matter how research articles are accessed, some costs 
must be paid.31 The downward sloping black line is the demand for accessing articles. 
The x-axis depicts the quantity of research articles accessed. The y-axis depicts the price 
per article accessed. Overlaying the x-axis is the red dashed line, which is the marginal 
cost MC = 0 of accessing a research article. That marginal costs are zero or nearly zero 
does not, however, imply that journal access is free. There are fixed costs built in to free 
access: Computer hardware, software, IT support staff salaries, marketing, servers, and so 
on. The solid green curve AC depicts the average fixed costs underlying access.  
The blue, orange and red dots are the equilibrium points in monopolized, author-
pays and competitive markets. A monopoly is used instead of an oligopoly for ease of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Assume that demand, marginal revenue and marginal cost are linear. 
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illustration. At the blue dot, a commercial publisher sets the price of access at Pm. The 
number of articles accessed is Qmc. The area Pmefg is the profit that commercial 
publishers gain from setting these prices. These prices allow the publisher to exceed the 
average costs of article access.  
The orange dot represents the demand for article access in an author-pays system. 
The amount of articles accessed is Qc and the price of this access is equal to MC. The 
area abcd depicts the amount of money that must be paid to cover the fixed costs of 
article access. Price equaling marginal cost is possible due to technological factors, such 
as the Internet, that allow research articles to be easily accessed as frequently as desired. 
Though the cost of accessing additional articles is zero, the average cost of accessing 
these articles is above zero. During an interview, Fritz Pannekoek captured this reality by 
asking, “Who’s funding the universities? Who, when it’s all free, is paying salaries?” 
A competitive market is represented by the red dot. Access prices are Pac. 
Quantities of access are Qac. These variables meet exactly at the average cost of access. In 
such a market, journal producers such as those operated by scholarly societies sell access 
to their product at competitive prices. As a consequence, prices are lower and quantities 
accessed are higher than in the monopolized market.   
The black arrow between Pm and Pac pinpoints the gap between the higher prices 
charged by commercial publishers and prices that would be expected in a competitive 
market. Note that this gap is reflected in the APC costs depicted in Table 5 on page 44.32 
Governments have tried to close this price gap by, for example, subsidizing some of the 
access costs incurred by authors. These subsidies work by forcing a convergence of Pm 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 The purple shaded rows depict Pm and the green shaded rows depict Pc. 
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and Pac. The pink arrow between Pac and 0, however, shows the difference between prices 
found in a competitive and author-pays market. For an author-pays system to exist, this 
price gap must be closed. This is synonymous with paying for amount found in the area 
abcd. Assuming that government pays to close this gap, then the investment needed to 
drive price to zero is akin to government controlling the system.  
 Reaching the “open access” equilibrium may not be feasible if figure four is 
accurate. People who argue that open access is nearly costless are actually referring to the 
negligible marginal costs of production. Paying for the average costs of production are 
another matter. Widespread cooperation between academic libraries and universities 
would be needed to push the price gap to zero. The problem, however, is having all or 
many academic libraries and universities cooperate by simultaneously investing in a 
widespread author-pays system. Such coordination becomes increasingly difficult as the 
number of stakeholders rises. For example, having every university and library in Canada 
work together is more difficult than having universities and libraries in one province 
work together. The following section describes this problem of collective action. 
4.3 Changing the Status Quo – A Game Theoretic View 
Ideally, from a government perspective, academic libraries and universities would 
implement a national bilingual author-pays system without government help. Language is 
an important consideration, as Canada is a bilingual country. This outcome would satisfy 
research libraries, universities, academics and authors that believe in the ideal of open 
access. Implementing an author-pays system, however, requires the actors to cooperate. 
Cooperating requires them to account for several related factors deemed sufficient to 
reach a new status quo without government intervention (CRKN-CARL 2012). These 
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intertwined factors are the following: Supplying more information to academics and 
institutions on the usefulness of open access, finding new funding sources, having 
academic librarians liaise with policymakers in the tri-councils, and finding a sustainable 
cost-sharing model.  
The Working Group offers a clear plan to move to an “open access world” 
(Owen, B., Blay, J., Clapperton, M., Godolphin, J., Hannaford, J., et al. 2012). The 
actors, however, have not been able to individually or collectively act on all of these 
recommendations. The market failure has created conditions that privilege individual 
self-interest as the primary guide for behaviour. These vested interests guide actors’ 
decision-making processes even if the outcome is not collectively ideal. Consider the 
case of Consortia Canada. Despite having many members, the group has not been able 
implement an author-pays model. Limited money is the primary reason for this inaction. 
Consortia members are risk averse and will not invest in models that are too costly 
(2012).  
Overcoming vested interests is complex and not fully desirable in all cases for all 
stakeholders. In the first place, .+!=.;L>4<;@D!K;,,!L+,=.@/4;,D!P>!@:>!H;4<@!;.L><@+4!;.@+!/.! /=@:+4S?/D<! <D<@>-! P>C/=<>! @:>D! K;,,! P>! ?/D;.G! P+@:! <=P<C4;?@;+.! H>><! /.0!/=@:+4<O! ?/G>! H>><A! *>C+.0, some actors benefit from parts of the current model. 
Academic libraries and academics still find use in the services offered by commercial 
publishers and the ability to access all journal types. Finally, many of the actors have 
neither the power nor the money to act unilaterally and overcome their individual 
interests. Actors who are the least satisfied with the current model do not have the power 
to motivate other, more powerful stakeholders to change. Coupling this lack of power 
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with individual financial constraints thus renders any desire to jointly pursue the 
collective interest untenable.  
Game Theory is useful to elaborate on why cooperation has not developed. 
Additionally, Game theoretic concepts can show the strategies that would produce a 
collectively ideal outcome and identify the so-called “winners” and “losers” of strategic 
decision-making. Applying these concepts to CARL and Consortia Canada is justifiable. 
The decisions of each association are the best approximation of the preferences of their 
aggregate members. If the policymaking processes that underpin the academic and library 
communities are the ideal unit of analysis, then the groups that represent these 
populations are the easiest units to analyze. They collectively represent the preferences of 
the broadest range of stakeholders. 
The Prisoners’ Dilemma details this cooperative gridlock. This dilemma refers to 
a paradox that can arise in cases of cooperative decision-making involving two or more 
rational actors. Imagine a scenario in which two partners, X and Y, have been arrested for 
committing a crime. They are placed in separate cells and cannot communicate with each 
other. A lack of evidence forces the police to charge each prisoner with a lesser charge. 
The prisoners can either betray the other by testifying that the other committed the crime 
or cooperate by staying quiet.  
 The results are the following: If both X and Y are quiet, each will only serve 1 year in 
prison. This choice is collectively rational, as each are convicted of the lesser charge. If X 
betrays and Y is quiet, X will be freed and Y will serve 10 years in prison. This choice is 
not individually rational for Y, as the punishment is the longest prison term (X receives 
the best individual outcome). If X and Y both betray the other, each is imprisoned for 7 
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years. Betraying each other is individually rational, as freedom is the award if the other 
does not betray. The paradox arises when X and Y each betray the other. Betrayal is the 
individually rational decision for the prisoners. The result is that X and Y receive the 
second-harshest punishment, when cooperating would have yielded the lowest prison 
term (Poundstone 1992). 
 Universities and academic libraries face this dilemma. Each must make 
individually irrational financial decisions to move to an author-pays system. Cooperation, 
which is collectively beneficial, would make this change easier. One example is that 
universities and libraries might avoid paying for open access infrastructure (the 
individually irrational decision), even if every other institution and person would benefit 
from using the infrastructure (the collectively rational decision).  This scenario is akin to 
the two prisoners X and Y both staying quiet.  
Information also plays an important role in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The dilemma 
assumes that there are information asymmetries between the actors and that these 
imbalances skew their decision-making. One actor makes decisions without having full 
information on the behaviour of the other actor. In the journal market, however, 
universities and library associations share information to reduce these asymmetries. The 
stakeholders work to keep each other as informed as possible.  
This dilemma faced by universities and academic libraries is illustrated in Table 
six below. What is shown are the actual and potential strategies used by CARL and 
Consortia Canada when deciding whether or not to invest in digital infrastructure as part 
of a national open access strategy. Investing is defined as CARL and Consortia Canada 
spending money normally earmarked for subscriptions on an author-pays system. The 
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actual and potential strategies are presented in a 2x2 payoff matrix, where C = 
“cooperate”, D = “defect”, R = “reward”, T = “temptation”, P = “punishment”, and S = 
“sucker”. A Prisoners Dilemma is present if the formula T > R > P > S is satisfied. These 




Payoff matrix for Consortia Canada and CARL 
Equilibrium  Consortia Canada Invest (C) Consortia Canada Not Invest (D) 
CARL Invest (C) 5 (R), 5 (R) 0 (S), 10 (T) 
CARL Not Invest (D) 10 (T), 0 (S) 3 (P), 3 (P) 
 
 The actors are choosing to not invest, seen in the bottom right cell. This dominant 
strategy is individually rational, as tight budgets and high costs constrain the choices that 
each group can make. Research libraries and universities typically do not have the budget 
to unilaterally invest in a large-scale author-pays system (recall the failure of Synergies 
acting alone). The “defect” by “defect” cell illustrates this scenario. The individually 
rational decision is to not invest, as taking individual action is either untenable or 
impossible. The “punishment” takes the form of both groups losing out on the additional 
benefits that mutual investment would create. That is, joint defection is the collectively 
irrational strategy.  
Mutual investment, seen in the top left cell, is the collectively rational strategy. 
This decision yields a greater overall return than mutual noninvestment (5 > 3). The 
returns can take any of the forms discussed earlier. In practice, this means that research 
libraries and universities reap long-term benefits that exceed any benefits yielded by the 
other strategies. Both actors are rewarded (R, R) for their cooperation.  
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 The bottom-left and top-right cells detail scenarios in which only one group 
invests. These cells show the conditions under which free riding is most likely to happen 
and who is most likely to free ride, where the free rider = 0 and the investor = 10. In 
practice, this would entail one or the other groups investing while the other does not. The 
investing group bears the full cost burden. The group that does not invest, however, still 
benefits from the new infrastructure. Both actors are united in their support of academics 
and the research community and would not restrict the other group from using the 
infrastructure.   
4.4 Discussion 
Underpinning all of the actors’ decisional processes are time horizons. The 
collective action problem persists in part because the actors are focusing only on short-
term survival. As a consequence, any benefits that might accrue over time are discounted 
and/or lost. Stated another way, time frames have consequences for how individually 
rational decision-making is interpreted. Individual decisions only consider the immediate 
to short-term costs of investment. If benefits accrued over time have either no impact or a 
positive impact, then individually rational short-term choices become irrational over time. 
If only the short-term environment is considered, then benefits will be lost and costs will 
not be controlled. Moving to an “open access world” will stall and the status quo will not 







PUBLIC POLICY INTERVENTIONS 
 
Assuming that Consortia Canada, CARL and academics cannot find a way to 
cooperate on implementing any national open access strategy, then the government has a 
choice of whether or not to intervene. This chapter will cover a variety of policy options 
available to the government, as well as the implications of implementing these policies. I 
will consider in particular two policy instruments that governments might employ: 
subsidization and information provision. In each case the goal of using these instruments 
is improved access to academic research. The government can also take no action and let 
the stakeholders resolve the issue themselves. 
A subsidy can be used in one or more of three ways: Cover APC costs, pay for 
digital infrastructure expansion or centralize publicly funded research. Any of these 
options is designed to close the price gap between oligopoly and competitive pricing. 
This policy is analogous to shrinking the “black arrow” gap detailed in Figure four on 
page 56. Shrinking this gap is designed to bring oligopoly prices closer to competitive 
pricing. Doing so would allow the recipients to better compete in the market.  
Information provision targets two points: Having the federal government 
officially endorse the “gold” open access model and informing academics, research 
libraries and universities on how open access and IPR can be used together. A joint 
policy of paying for APCs and informing actors on the legal dimensions of open access 
rather than any single policy, is most likely to create conditions sufficient for a new 
equilibrium to be reached. Recommendations from the Finch report and CRKN report, as 
well as comments from interviewees, suggest this to be the case (Finch 2011; Owen, B., 
Blay, J., Clapperton, M., Godolphin, J., Hannaford, J., et al.  2012). 
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All of the following policy options assume that liaising between stakeholders and 
policymakers has been and is an ongoing process. The policies are listed in descending 
order, with the most feasible policies being listed first. The criteria for ordering this list in 
this way are the following: Is the policy a Pareto improvement over the status quo? Does 
the policy offer sufficient incentives for stakeholders to change their behaviour? Is the 
policy politically viable? 
5.1 Subsidies 
5.1.1 Option 1:  Subsidize APCs 
The government can attempt to push oligopoly prices toward competitive prices 
by subsidizing APCs. The subsidy needs to range from $500 to $5000 per published 
article to align with market prices. The CIHR and NSERC will likely need a higher dollar 
amount compared to the SSHRC, since publishing costs differ between disciplines. The 
potential efficacy of subsidizing APCs is outlined in the Finch report, CARL-CRKN 
paper and comments from the interviewees. These sources argue that covering APC costs 
will give researchers an incentive to publish both in open access journals and through 
similar services offered by other commercial and non-commercial publishers.  
The Finch report (2011, 104) offers ways of implementing this policy. One way is 
by having the granting agencies reallocate funds from supporting research to paying for 
publishing and disseminating costs. For example, the SSHRC’s current Aid to Scholarly 
Journals grant is awarded to the editor-in-chief of a journal (Government of Canada 
SSHRCa 2014). Reallocating these funds into the standard research grant funds used by a 
principal investigator/project coordinator would require the recipient to carefully consider 
how best to spend the money on publishing.  
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The Tri-Councils currently require all researchers who receive a standard research 
grant to file a variety of reports over the span of the research period. One such document 
is a final report filed no more than three months after the end of the research project. The 
agencies can adapt the final report to include the new APC policy. New sections detailing 
APC costs and the chosen peer-reviewed journal would be needed. For example, the 
Final Report – Form 10A used by the SSHRC for postdoctoral fellows would require new 
sections the grant holder would need to complete.33 
A researcher will be eligible for the APC funding only if the chosen journal 
publishes peer reviewed research. This eligibility criterion would align with the 
government’s commitment to support high quality research. This subsidy is particularly 
important for non-commercial publishers or publishers that normally survive on 
subscription revenue. Movements toward OA create conditions for consumers to drop 
subscriptions in favor of free access. Subsidizing publishing researchers would enable 
non-profit publishers to replace at least some of this lost subscription revenue with 
money used by individual researchers.  
Requiring grant holders to choose how much money to spend on publishing is 
important. Canadian academics are currently isolated from pressures in the academic 
journal market. This isolation has emerged due to funds designed to cover publishing and 
disseminating costs being gifted from their host institution, academic library or publisher 
to researchers. Researchers do not, therefore, have an incentive to consider publishing 
costs. Reallocating APC funding into the standard research grant requires that grant 
holders account for publishing costs by being exposed to journal market pressures.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!




Covering APCs may or may not be politically viable. One argument that renders 
this option politically feasible is that researchers are only eligible if their research has 
been accepted for publication in a peer reviewed journal. Doing so would raise the odds 
that the funding would not used to pay for publishing in poor journals. The grants would 
thus be used to promote the flourishing of high quality research. The result is an 
alignment with the government’s goal of becoming a global leader in science, 
technology, research, and development. Similarly, the increasing movement toward an 
“open access” world could pressure policy makers to act. If this is the case, then the 
policy is politically viable. 
On the other hand, not all journals are peer reviewed. Journals that do not use the 
peer review process would be ineligible for the grant. These publishers, as well as their 
customers, could be unhappy that their journal was unsupportable. This displeasure could 
manifest as political action, assuming that the stakeholders could coalesce into a group 
that is sufficiently powerful to exert political influence. This does not necessarily mean, 
however, that such a group could form. The power of journal owners is currently limited, 
and the loss of journals will not necessarily motivate them to cooperate. 
5.1.2 Option 2: Subsidize digital infrastructure expansion  
The Canada Foundation for Innovation (CFI) is responsible for funding projects 
for the research community and investing in digital infrastructure for institutions. Digital 
infrastructure is defined as computers, servers, online architecture for repositories and 
journals, and the information technology experts who both maintain the computers and 
create the necessary online searchable databases. Expansion is defined as spending the 
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money needed to buy more computers and servers, and hire the experts needed to create 
and maintain these techmologies. The SSHRC is currently investigating the expansion of 
digital infrastructure as part of a strategy to improve Canada’s digital economy 
(Government of Canada SSHRCb 2013). The Agency could directly invest in 
infrastructure that affects open access, in addition to the other stated targets.  
An appropriate dollar amount for the investments is not known. Liaising with 
stakeholders will produce a funding range that will address expansion costs. The cost of 
hardware and software will differ according to the size and needs of the institution. 
Academics who publish may only need investments in hard infrastructure, such as 
computers. Academic libraries, however, may need investment in all types of 
infrastructure.  
Expanding infrastructure may or may not be politically viable. This subsidy may 
not be viable if the expected cost of expansion is very high. Unlike APCs, the cost of 
installing and maintaining new computers and software can be very expensive. On the 
other hand, investing in infrastructure probably only needs to be done once. New 
infrastructure, if properly maintained, can last for many years.   
The CFIs’ investment portfolio shows a successful track record of investing in 
open access initiatives. The CFI recently awarded a $100 million grant to the University 
of Toronto, with a portion of the money being dedicated to creating open access research 
tools for epigenetics (University of Toronto 2013). Similar digital infrastructure 
initiatives were also awarded money. A downloadable database of the CFI investments 
are found on their website (Canada Foundation for Innovation 2013). 
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Subsidizing infrastructure upgrades and APCs create conditions for the open 
access journal market to grow. The demand for open journals could increase, both in 
Canada and abroad. Publishers of these journals, as well as academics and librarians who 
value the idea of freely accessible knowledge, would benefit as a result. The uncertain 
sustainability of open journals, however, renders this policy risky. The granting agencies 
know about this instability and could be reluctant to create new APC programs. The 
agencies and/or their funders could decide that money spent on APCs would be better 
used on other policies.  
The net effect on the economy from investing in infrastructure would likely be 
positive. This is due to the value added by contracting workers in the hardware business 
to work on infrastructure upgrades. That is, upgrade grants would provide jobs. Upgraded 
infrastructure could also give members of academia more ways to have their research 
freely accessible. Assuming that research-related economic benefits accrue over time, and 
that these benefits exceed the grant costs, then the grant could benefit the Canadian 
economy.  
A possible consequence of only supporting peer reviewed journals, however, is 
that the market for non-peer reviewed journals diminishes in size. Using peer review as 
an exclusion criterion would motivate this outcome. Whether or not this outcome is 
undesirable, however, is debatable. On the one hand, journals from all academic 
disciplines could suffer. If these journals disappear, then the body of potential knowledge 
could be smaller than if the journals persisted. On the other hand, non-peer reviewed 
research is rarely useful or used by much of the academic community.      
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There are also academic freedom issues to consider. First, the peer reviewed 
exclusion criterion restricts academics in where they want to publish. Without being able 
to use the APC grant on all journals, academics do not have full publishing freedom. This 
may or may not be problematic. If some academics publish in non-peer reviewed 
journals, then they could be unhappy about having their publishing decisions restricted.  
Second, these grants create a tradeoff between supporting academic freedom and 
controlling the ways in which public money is spent. Opening the grant to academics 
allows them the freedom to publish where they want, subject to the peer review criterion. 
A likely result is that the recipients pay to publish in non-Canadian commercial journals.  
Doing so perpetuates the scenario where publicly funded research is toll-gated and paid 
for using public money. Commercial publishers would welcome this scenario, whereas 
academics and libraries would continue working in the status quo.  
The concerns about Canada’s innovation status are another consideration. The 
adjudication process is driven, in part, by determining the substantive impact a given 
research project could have on the economy or existing body of knowledge. Not all 
research is innovative. As a result, “non-innovative” projects may not receive funding. 
Researchers conducting basic research or experimental research will likely be unhappy if 
their work cannot be funded based on this rationale.  If this is the case, then the potential 
body of research will be smaller than if all projects had equal consideration.  
5.1.3 Option 3:  Centralize publicly funded research 
This option entails placing all publicly funded research into a central repository. 
This option is a way of supporting the “green” repository model. Doing so, either by 
mandate or encouragement, will address issues that libraries have when building 
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repositories that fit their customers’ needs.  Canadian stakeholders are challenged by a 
need to either locate small-scale open access business models that can work on the 
national stage or combine the existing piecemeal repositories into a unified national 
model.  
One way to implement this option is expanding the federal Open Data pilot 
program to house publicly funded research. This program is testing the efficacy of 
providing free access to government-compiled statistical and regulatory information. The 
program has been expanded into 2013 to further these tests (Open Data 2013). Expanding 
the pilot program offer academics a single repository to use.  Another way to implement 
this option is to expand the National Research Council Publications Archive (NRC 2013) 
to accept manuscripts from any discipline. The archive is a searchable database that 
currently contains research from the STM disciplines. Expansion may require investment 
in computers that will provide the necessary virtual space to hold more works.   
Centralization is less feasible politically than the other options. Requiring or 
encouraging that research be placed into either the Open Data or NRC repositories 
implies government control via the centralization of research. The current government is 
likely to oppose these measures on ideological grounds. In an environment characterized 
by devolution of powers, centralizing research access when there are many existing non-
government repositories is untenable. In the case of the NRC, authors must sign a license 
that transfers some copyrights to the Crown. This transfer implies that the government 
owns part of the research. The usefulness of the Open Data repository, by contrast, is still 
undetermined. Expanding the program to be open access before determining the efficacy 
of making government data freely accessible may be hasty.  
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Expanding the program also raises practical issues. All data that are currently 
entered into the program are government-compiled data. Academic research, however, 
does not fit this description. Changing the status of publicly funded research to fit this 
description would require a host of time-consuming changes, legislative or otherwise. 
The benefits of supporting open repositories are more easily achieved through other 
means, such as the tri-council’s depositing requirements.  
Another consideration is infrastructure upkeep. As repositories increase in size of, 
the need for IT experts to maintain the repository and its’ contents increases. Without 
regular upkeep, there is a risk that the deposited material will degrade over time. Having 
a greater volume of data puts extra strain on salaried IT experts to keep the repository and 
its contents healthy. Hiring more IT experts to fill this function may be an inefficient use 
of public resources, as there are many repositories that already exist. 
5.2 Information provision 
5.2.1 Option 1: Federal support for “gold” publishing 
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) could express support for “gold” open access 
as the next step in aligning with policies taken by the UK government. This support could 
be expressed through a news release This policy requires no initial dollar investment and 
only a minimal time investment. Future costs, however, are likely to emerge from the 
granting agencies and the academic community. The granting agencies and academic 
community would have greater leverage than they currently have to lobby the 
government for more money. Implementing this policy also signals to the international 
community that Canada is committed to the ideological and practical sides of open 
access.  
! ($!
This policy is not politically feasible if the government values cost cutting over 
research accessibility. Having the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) voice support for open 
access will allow the academic community and granting agencies to demand more 
funding. This support is unlikely as there is evidence of a strained relationship between 
academia and the federal government (Fitzpatrick 2012). On the other hand, the PMO 
voicing support does not imply that more funding must be given. The government risks 
facing backlash if support is voiced but no funding is given. This risk, however, is 
contingent on whether any lobby groups have sufficient power to affect the policy 
process. Without the power to affect the policy process, such risk is low. 
5.2.2 Option 2: Inform stakeholders on the benefits of OA  
The Tri-Agencies can inform academics and academic librarians about the 
benefits, legality and uses of open access. This is possible by working closely with 
institutional librarians and research support officers in building or changing institutional 
open access policies. Providing education in this way could give the recipients the 
information needed to pursue open access alternatives. The Internet is the ideal vehicle 
through which this information can be disseminated. Information about the services 
provided by this office can be attached to online grant applications and/or e-mailed to 
libraries or universities to be distributed at their discretion. 
This policy is politically viable. The Internet renders information access nearly 
costless in dollars and time. As such, the granting agencies will be able to quickly and 
efficiently direct grant recipients access to the Office website. This efficiency will allow 
the granting agencies to avoid any criticisms over wasting public money. This policy also 
! (%!
does not require any involvement from political actors. The agencies do not need extra 
money to enact this policy and have the latitude the act independently.  
5.3 Take no action 
The government can choose to let market forces create a new status quo. There is 
evidence that a transition to an “open access world” will happen whether additional 
intervention is pursued or not. If this is the case, then the government can save money by 
waiting for the stakeholders to manage the issues themselves. This policy does not, 
however, imply that the government does nothing. Enforcing existing rules to ensure a 
“fair playing ground” for the market actors is a continuous process. Transition must still 
be legal and as fair as possible.  
This action, or rather inaction, is politically feasible and possibly even desirable. 
Minimal intervention and a push to streamline the government is an ongoing trend in the 
current government (McIlroy 2012). Taking no action falls in line with these values and 
actions. There is also evidence of tension between the academic community and the 
current federal government. Commentary on the actions of the government suggests that 
this is the case (Linnitt 2013).   
There are trade offs to consider if this policy is pursued. Waiting for the 
stakeholders to resolve the issue will result in a temporary loss of access to research.  If 
prices continue to rise, then this accessibility loss will keep increasing until the critical 
point where the equilibrium shift happens. In other words, access to a public good will 
become increasingly restricted. The government also risks alienating members of 
academia who consider the government as the most important actor to facilitate open 
access transition and/or control acquisition costs. Concerned stakeholders could join an 
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existing lobby group or coalesce into a lobby group and push the government to act. 
Similarly, these actors could become more vocal about the duties that they think the 
government should perform.  
Taking no action sends more than one signal about what is on the government’s 
agenda. The first signal is that the issue is deemed resolvable without government 
intervention. If no action is taken, then the government is expressing confidence that 
market forces will push the actors to a new equilibrium, although it is not clear how. The 
second signal includes the global community. No action signals to the international 
community that Canada does not consider making publicly funded research accessible to 
all as an issue sufficient to reach the government’s agenda.  
These signals are particularly striking in light of recent actions taken by the 
governments of Britain, Australia and the United States. They have invested the resources 
into promoting and facilitating the varied forms of open access transition. These actions 
imply that accessibility is sufficiently important to reach their agenda. These 
governments consider research accessibility an issue worthy of intervention beyond the 
open repository mandate. These actions also suggest that the governments are not 
sufficiently confident in market forces to create a new equilibrium. 
There is also a reputational issue to consider. One traditional view is that Canada 
works in favor of public goods by targeting specific points in a market for intervention. 
The resulting perception is one of a government that considers intervention acceptable if 
the public interest is satisfied (MacQueen 2007). Leaving the stakeholders to solve the 
problem suggests that the government considers market forces, rather than open access, 
the ideal mechanism to determine who pays what cost. Coupling this attitude with the 
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lagging of open access policies portrays Canada as a place where the government does 
not support intervention in markets, even if a public goods case can be made.  
5.4 Public policy implications 
 An ongoing trend in the Canadian public administration is the decentralizing of 
government responsibilities. That is, non-government actors are given the ability to 
perform functions that were formerly controlled by the government. This goal is achieved 
via the government giving some of its power to others (Winfield, Kaufman and Whorely 
2000, 5). This devolved power allows the recipient, rather than the government to 
perform the given function. In the case of publicly funded academic research the 
government is mostly leaving the actors to resolve the cost issue alone. The government 
is not devolving authority to other actors.  
Aside from non-action, power devolution is reflected in all of the policy proposals 
above. If the government gives power to semi-public or private entities, as is the case 
with funding programs that allow academic institutions and members of academia to have 
spending latitude, then principal-agent theory must be considered. The principal-agent 
problem arises when the principal contracts an agent to perform some duty without 
having perfect information on how the agent acts. The agent then performs this duty for a 
third party (Braun 1993). In this case, the principals are the advanced education 
policymakers, the agents are the funding agency intermediaries and the third parties are 
the recipient institutions and individuals. The devolved power is the decision-making 
capacity for the agents and funding recipients to control how the money is used.  
The only accountability mechanisms available to track the use of devolved power 
are guidelines built into grant programs, applicant vetting processes and periodic follow-
! ((!
up with recipients. Implementing any of the proposed policies will require more 
enforcement. Unfortunately, these mechanisms are not perfect. Any new or existing 
mechanism will not necessarily prevent an agent from misusing a devolved power or 
catch an agent who is misusing a power. Misuse of grant funding does happen, as was the 
case with two recipients of an NSERC grant (Government of Canada NSERC 2014).  
 The government faces a tradeoff between giving up some power to non-
government actors and letting market forces dictate market dynamics. The results of 
either decision are neither fully positive nor negative. Leaving the actors to manage the 
issue themselves could result in a prolonged drop in the accessibility to a public good. In 
return, the government saves scarce resources for other policies. Intervening, however, 















POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 Policy Recommendations 
The policies in the table below are ranked using the criteria implementation 















Short Easy Medium High High 
Provide legal 
information 
Short Very easy Very low High High 
Take no action Short Very easy Low Very high Low 
Subsidize 
infrastructure 












Short Difficult Very low Very low High 
Note. Rankings are determined based on complexity. 
 
 
Using these criteria, a policy package that combines directing granting agency 
funds to subsidize APCs with a campaign of education and awareness-building is the 
most defensible reaction to the open access challenge. This relative low-cost package has 
the most potential to satisfy as many actors as possible. There are no significant political 
barriers to be overcome. The research councils have past experience using programs of 
this nature. Using strict application guidelines can better ensure that the funding is only 
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used on high-quality research. Although the subsidy will not immediately result in 
moving to an author-pays system, the recipients will have sufficient incentives to use 
open access journals.  
There are, however, weaknesses to implementing the APC subsidy. First, the 
conservative culture of academia could interfere with the effectiveness of the policy. 
Academics could resist combining APC money with tri-council funding. Being exposed 
to market pressures could be viewed as an attack on academic freedom and academic 
culture. For example, academics that normally publish in expensive journals may need to 
find a less costly and less prestigious and impactful alternative journal. If she had to use 
money that otherwise would be devoted to research. This issue is related to the 
conservative culture of academia. Being exposed to market pressure, which is a 
significant change that academics may not want, will not necessarily change the 
academic culture. 
Second, this subsidy will not necessarily change the oligopolistic structure of the 
market or lower the overall costs of publishing. The commercial publishers are located in 
Europe and service customers around the world. Having access to a large customer base 
could minimize any potential profit loss faced by the publishers. Canada is also a 
relatively small player in the journal market. This means that changes in the behaviour of 
successful applicants will not necessarily change the behaviour of the publishers or the 
costs of publishing. 
Third, transitioning toward freer access to research also entails transition costs. 
Anticipating and minimizing these costs is therefore important. First, APC amounts will 
not necessarily stay unchanged through the process. For example, some high quality 
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journals with low readership may need to increase APCs to cover lost subscription 
revenue. Other subscription journals could lose submissions of the highest quality 
research to OA journals that have less expensive costs. In some cases, a loss of readership 
and/or high quality submissions could cause some journals to die off.  
The Finch report (2011, 111) advises that transition should occur over several 
years. Transition, however, requires cooperation between academic libraries, universities, 
academics, publishers, and the granting agencies. As noted in Chapter four, working 
together will not necessarily be easy. The granting agencies can continually liaise with 
universities, learned societies, academics, and publishers. Liaising can allow the 
government to track the changing publishing landscape. This monitoring is possible by 
using indicators such as changes to the average cost of APCs charged by journals and the 
growth of OA journals and repositories over time.  
Taking no action is self-explanatory. This policy scores well in all metrics other 
than stakeholder satisfaction. Academics, universities and libraries will be unsatisfied. 
Similarly, subsidizing infrastructure scores well in many categories. The biggest issue is 
cost. The amount and type of infrastructure that is needed is unknown, and costs could be 
high.  
The remaining policies suffer from at least one significant weakness. Centralizing 
publicly funded research is costly, not politically viable and difficult to implement and 
maintain. Federal support of open access journals is the probably the least desirable 
policy. If this policy were implemented, lobbyists would be given a so-called “green 
light” to ask the federal government for more funding. Coupling these possible costs with 
a government aiming to cut costs renders the implementing of this policy untenable. 
! )"!
6.2 Conclusion 
One of the primary responsibilities of the Canadian government is to promote and 
support the public good. Academic knowledge, codified in journals as research articles, 
meets the criteria for being such a good. The ways in which this knowledge can be 
accessed have become increasingly restricted over time due to oligopolistic and 
competitive market behaviour. Some stakeholders have responded by calling for new 
“open access” status quo, free of such behaviour. Implementing a wide-scale author-pays 
system is argued to be the ideal way to reach this new equilibrium.  
A series of related policies, if implemented, could result in a wide-scale author-
pays system. Despite having such a blueprint, the academic community has been unable 
to cooperate. Insights from Game Theory suggest that this group is experiencing a 
collective action problem. The costs of individual action are too high to justify 
cooperation, with government involvement being an important requirement.  
The government, which has policy tools that can offer incentives for Canadian 
stakeholders to find an open access equilibrium, face financial and political tradeoffs for 
any decisions made. Generally, the Government of Canada has an opportunity to 
synchronize its’ open access policies with similar developments around the world. Doing 
so will promote the flourishing of Canadian research on the international stage and 
provide researchers from developing countries costless access to quality research from all 
disciplines. 
Open access is an under researched topic in the academic literature. This thesis 
contributes to the literature by providing avenues for future comparative and international 
research. First, the exclusion of open access books presents an opportunity to identify 
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whether or not the market for these goods is similar to the journal market. Major 
initiatives such as the Berlin Declaration make no mention of open access books, despite 
many academic disciplines rely on these sources.  
Second, the basic economic models will help academics, policymakers and other 
interested stakeholders better understand the significant changes entailed by open access 
transition. Understanding these changes can help stakeholders cooperate to more 
effectively address the financial issues of an author-pays system. Similarly, public 
policymakers can craft policies that effectively address these cost issues. 
Third, the collective action problem succinctly defines the dilemma faced by 
decision makers in Canada and abroad. International communities, academic or 
otherwise, can benefit from the knowledge generated by wealthier countries. Coordinated 
international cooperation is required to grant less wealthy countries free access to this 
research. These decision makers will therefore benefit by knowing what is needed for 
cooperation to emerge. 
Finally, this thesis primarily looked at open access from a Western perspective. 
Freely accessible knowledge touches upon any place that has an Internet connection; as 
such, there are opportunities to expand upon comparative elements. Geographically, 
research could focus on the many places that are unstudied or under studied. Two 
important topics are stakeholder attitudes toward freely accessible knowledge from non-
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Thank you for participating in this interview. My name is Jeff Martin, and I am currently doing research 
with the Executive Director of the Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of 
Saskatchewan. I am doing some work on open access publishing in Canada and abroad. The academic 
journal market is currently going through a variety of changes that have captured the attention of many 
stakeholders. An ‘open access movement’ has gradually emerged within academia, with members wanting 
publicly funded academic research to be freely accessible to everybody. Others argue that the current 




I’m particularly interested in finding out the attitudes held by experts from different parts of the academic 
journal publishing market on the idea of freely accessible knowledge, open access and functioning of the 
market. As an expert involved in the market, I am interested in hearing your perspectives on the following 
questions. 
 
1. How would you characterize the current state of the academic journal market? 
2. Do you think the dynamics are sustainable? 
3. What are some of the biggest hurdles to be overcome before any national open access model can 
be implemented? 
4. What role, if any, did the idea of making academic knowledge freely accessible to everyone play 
in policy discussions that you’ve taken part of? 
5. In what ways did the Government of Canada, either the granting agencies or otherwise, participate 
in open access policy discussions or actions that you’ve taken part in? 
6. Have you noticed any differences in discussions between the social sciences and humanities 
versus the natural sciences, medicine, technology, and so on? 
7. In what way, if any, should the government participate in future policy discussions? 
8. Do you think if the higher levels of government took a firm stance on the open access issue, do 
you think that that would have any sort of impact?  






34 Some of the questions were omitted depending on the background of the participant. 
